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Abstract
A market with asymmetric information can be viewed as a repeated exchange game
between the informed sector and the uninformed one. In a market with risk-neutral
agents, De Meyer [2010] proves that the price process should be a particular kind of
Brownian martingale called CMMV. This type of dynamics is due to the strategic use of
their private information by the informed agents. In the current paper, we consider the
more realistic case where agents on the market are risk-averse. This case is much more
complex to analyze as it leads to a non-zero-sum game. Our main result is that the price
process is still a CMMV under a martingale equivalent measure. This paper provides
thus a theoretical justification for the use of the CMMV class of dynamics in financial
analysis. This class contains as a particular case the Black and Scholes dynamics.
JEL Classification: G14, C72, C73, D44
Keywords: Asymmetric information, Price dynamics, Martingales of maximal variation,
Repeated games, Martingale equivalent measure, Risk aversion
1 Introduction
Information asymmetries are omnipresent in financial markets. We do not mean here in-
sider trading which is illegal but agents on the market are de facto asymmetrically informed:
institutionals have clearly a better access to information than private investors. They have
access to more information, quicker, and they are better skilled to analyze it. Typically,
they have more information on the companies whom shares they are trading and they have
entire services analyzing the economic conjuncture. Aside these information about the eco-
nomic health of the underlying firms, they also have access to an other kind of private
information that is relevant to forecast the price evolution: they often serve as intermediary
between their clients and the market. When receiving an important order from a client, they
clearly receive a private information that will affect the short term price evolution. They
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will typically use this information in an optimal way to get the best execution price. This is
the focus of the literature on optimal execution, as introduced in Almgren and Chriss [2001].
In these situations everybody is aware that informational asymmetries exist and knows
who are the informed agents. Informed agents’ actions on the market are therefore ana-
lyzed by the uninformed agents in order to deduce the informative content behind these
actions. As suggested in previous papers (De Meyer and Saley [2003] and De Meyer [2010]),
this phenomenon could partially explain the kind of price dynamics observed on the market.
These papers model the market with a single risky asset which is exchanged for coun-
terpart a nume´raire. For simplicity they consider a short period of time just after a single
asymmetric information shock. Because the time period considered is short, it can be
assumed that there is no consumption and the aim of the agent is to maximize the ex-
pected value of their final portfolio. The informational shock is materialized by a initial
private random message m received by the informed player. This message will influence
the final price L of the risky asset which can thus be viewed as a deterministic function
L = L(m). L(m) contains in fact all the relevant information carried by m. Therefore the
structure of the initial information asymmetry can be simplified. Since m is random, so
is L(m). Denoting µ the probability distribution of L(m), the initial informational shock
is now modeled by a initial lottery selecting L with probability µ once for all. Player 1 is
informed of L while Player 2 just knows µ. After this initial information shock, players are
exchanging assets during n consecutive trading rounds, using a trading mechanism. This is
thus a repeated exchange game of incomplete information a` la Aumann and Maschler [1995].
De Meyer and Saley [2003] analyzes a game between two risk-neutral market makers
with asymmetric information. They focus on a very particular trading mechanism and
proved that as market markers play more and more frequently (n going to infinity), the
equilibrium price process converges to a continuous martingale involving a Brownian mo-
tion in its description. This result gives thus an endogenous justification for the appearance
of the Brownian term in the price dynamics: it is seen as an aggregation of the random
day after day noises introduced by the informed agents on their moves to avoid too fast
revelation of their private information.
This idea was generalized in De Meyer [2010] that argues that a market with incomplete
information can be modeled by a two player game between the informed sector and the
uninformed sector. In first approximation these sectors are considered in De Meyer [2010] as
individually rational and risk-neutral agents. In such a description the uninformed sector is
typically made of an aggregation of a large number of agents. It is then difficult to describe
precisely the set of all possible actions of all those agents (which would be a complete
action profile, one for each individual agent). This is the reason for modeling the market
by an abstract trading mechanism. Such a mechanism simply maps a pair of actions to the
resulting share transfer between the two sectors. The uninformed sector is then represented
by a ”representative agent” that selects rationally the action in that action space. Five
conditions are imposed on the trading mechanism to model real world markets. When
those conditions are satisfied, the trading mechanism is called natural.
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In games with natural trading mechanisms, it appears that the equilibrium price pro-
cesses converge, as the trading frequency increases. The limit process belongs to a very
particular class of Brownian martingale referred to as the class of ”Continuous Martingale
of Maximal Variation” (CMMV, see below definition 1).
In fact, the particular mechanism analyzed in [De Meyer and Saley, 2003] is a natural
mechanism and the dynamics observed in that paper is a particular CMMV. Let us em-
phasize that the asymptotic behavior of the prices is completely independent of the natural
trading mechanism used to model the market. We refer to that result as the universality of
the CMMV class.1
This universality of the CMMV class is still reinforced by the result of Gensbittel [2010].
This class is robust to the introduction of classical derivative assets: instead of considering
just one risky asset, he considers a multi-asset model with one underlying asset and a family
of monotonic derivatives. In that framework he shows that the limit of the price process of
each asset is a CMMV.
In the present paper, we extent this universality result, showing that the CMMV class
also appears in a model with risk-averse agents. This result suggests that the CMMV class
should be used in finance to model asset price evolutions. Notice that Black and Scholes
dynamics is a particular CMMV.
2 The content of this paper
The current paper analyzes the consequences of introducing risk aversion in the model. As
mentioned above, the uninformed sector is made of a large number of individual agents that
typically display risk-averse behavior. It is therefore natural to assume that the represen-
tative agent, called player 2, will be risk-averse. On the other hand, the informed agent
(player 1) typically represents a big institutional investor and it is natural to model it as a
risk-neutral agent.
This risk aversion is modeled with the introduction of a concave utility function in player
2’s payoff: he maximizes the expected utility of the final value of its portfolio. Due to this
utility function, we are not in front of a zero-sum game anymore as it was the case in the
previous mentioned papers. This makes the analysis more involved, the notions of value
and optimal strategies are here to be replaced by the notion of Nash equilibrium.
When dealing with very general trading mechanism with abstract action spaces, the
notion of price is not obvious. In the setting of risk neutrality, as in De Meyer [2010], the
price Lt at time t of the risky asset is defined as the conditional expectation of its final
value L given the public information at that time. This makes sense in the risk-neutral case
since this conditional expectation is precisely the price at which the uniformed agent would
agree to trade this asset. But this doesn’t make sense anymore in a risk-averse setting. We
1This universality of the CMMV class is a strong and surprising result. It is of the same vein as the
universality of the normal law in the central limit theorem. Actually, the convergence to a CMMV is proved
in [De Meyer, 2010] as a consequence of the central limit theorem.
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chose to bypass this issue by considering a particular exchange mechanism that naturally
involves prices.
There are so many uninformed agents on the market that aside from its informational
content, the action of player 1 will be quite marginal and the market without player 1 can
be considered as a device that produces a price at which player 1 can buy or sell a unit of
the asset. This amounts to view player 2 as a market maker.
We consider therefore a very simple mechanism where the uninformed sector is a market
maker that chooses at each period q ∈ {1 . . . , n} a price pq for one share of the risky asset,
and player 1 will have to decide whether he wants to buy (uq = 1) or to sell (uq = −1) at
this price. Note that the price pq is thus the number of shares of the nume´raire given in
exchange for 1 share of the risky asset. Since we suppose that the nume´raire has a liqui-
dation value equal to 1, the price pq as thus to be interpreted as an actualized price of the
risky asset. Both players try to maximize their utility for the liquidation value of their final
portfolio.
We first prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a game with fixed length n.
We then analyze equilibrium strategies. Under those strategies we analyze the law of the
price process (p1, . . . , pn) posted by player 2. Our next result is that this price dynamics
is consistent with the classical financial theory of no-arbitrage: the so-called ”fundamental
theorem of finance” by Harrison and Pliska [1981] claims that if there is no arbitrage on
the market, there exists an equivalent probability measure2, under which the actualized
price process would be a martingale. In our model with risk aversion, the (actualized)
equilibrium price process is not, in general, a martingale. However, as in Harrison and Pliska
[1981], there exists an equivalent probability measure under which this process become a
martingale.
This result is quite surprising in a context where Player 1 can only buy or sell a lim-
ited amount of assets. Indeed, the no-arbitrage theory assumes that if there would exist a
trading strategy leading to a positive final value at no initial cost, there would be such a
demand for this portfolio that the prices on the market would be affected and this arbitrage
would disappear. This argument fails in our model because in any case Player 1 can only
buy a limited amount at each period.
We then analyze the asymptotics of the price dynamics as the trading frequency in-
creases (n goes to infinity). The limit price process is a process in continuous time (where
t ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of elapsed trading periods). Our result is that under equivalent
probability measure mentioned above, the limit price process is a CMMV.
Again, this result reinforces the universality of the CMMV class. More precisely it
suggests that under the martingale equivalent probability measure, the price processes of
the assets should be a CMMV. Note in particular that this class contains the most used
dynamics in finance, which is one used in Black and Scholes [1973]. But there are plenty
other dynamics in this class, that could be used to develop pricing and hedging models.
2Two probabilities on a probability space are equivalent if they have the same events of probability 0.
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We now give a precise definition of CMMV:
Definition 1. A continuous martingale of maximal variation3 (CMMV) is a stochastic
process Π in continuous time t ∈ [0, 1], which is a martingale that satisfies for all t:
Πt = f(Bt, t)
where B is a standard Brownian motion and f : R × [0, 1] → R is a function which is
increasing in its first variable.
Let us emphasize that they are two conditions in the above definition. One is that
f(x, t) is increasing with x, and the other is that f(Bt, t) is a martingale, which implies
strong restriction on f . It follows in particular from Itoˆ’s formula that f must satisfy the
time reversed heat equation:
∂f
∂t
+
1
2
∂2f
∂x2
= 0.
3 Description of the model
Let µ be a probability distribution on R. The game Gn(µ) we are considering is the
n-times repeated games that proceeds as follows: at stage 0, nature selects once for all L at
random with probability distribution µ. Player 1 observes L, not player 2, and both players
know µ. This initial information period is followed by n trading periods. At each period
q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, player 1 decides to buy (uq = 1) or to sell (uq = −1) one unit of the risky
asset. uq ∈ {+1,−1} is thus the action of player 1. Simultaneously, player 2 selects the
price pq ∈ R of the transaction at stage q.
Remark 2. Choices are thus considered to be simultaneous: in our model, player 1 does not
observe player 2’s action before deciding whether to sell or buy. This can be surprising at
first glance. Indeed, one usually assumes that the trader will buy or sell after observing the
current market maker’s price. In fact, we argue that this sequential model where player 1
reacts to the price posted by player 2 is equivalent to our model. Indeed, we prove in section
5 that, due to Jensen’s inequality, the equilibrium strategy of player 2 in the simultaneous
game is a pure strategy. Player 2’s move pq is thus completely forecastable for player 1 at
period q. Player 1 would get no benefit from observing pq before selecting uq. Therefore the
equilibria in the simultaneous game are also equilibria in the sequential game.
That the game can be seen as a sequential game does not make mixed strategies useless.
Indeed, in a sequential game with full information players select at each stage the action that
will maximize their continuation payoff and this can be done with a pure strategy. However,
this game is of incomplete information and mixing is the keystone for player 1 to avoid too
fast revelation of his private information.
3The terminology ”CMMV” was introduced in De Meyer [2010] due to the following result. The n-
variation of a martingale (Xt)t∈[0,1] is V
n
X =
∑n−1
q=0 ‖X q+1
n
−X q
n
‖L1 . Consider the problem Mn of maximizing
the n-variation V nX on the class of martingales X with final distribution µ (X1 ∼ µ). It is proved in
De Meyer [2010] that the martingales that solve Mn, (i.e. martingales of maximal variation) converge in
finite distributions, as n goes to infinity, to a process that satisfies the above Definition 1.
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We denote hq the history of plays until round q, i.e. hq = (u1, p1, . . . , uq, pq) and Hq
the set of all possible histories until round q. At the end of stage q, uq and pq are publicly
revealed. Then both players know and remember all the past actions taken by both of
them. Since the game has perfect recall we can apply Kuhn’s theorem and there is no loss
of generality to assume that players use behavioral strategies.
A behavioral strategy for player 1 in this game is a sequence σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) with
σq : (hq−1, L) → σq(hq−1, L) ∈ ∆({−1,+1}), with the usual convention that ∆(S) is the
set of probabilities on a finite set S. A behavioral strategy for player 2 is a sequence
τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) with τq : hq−1 → τq(hq−1) ∈ ∆(R), where ∆(R) denote the set of Borel
probabilities on R. A triple (µ, σ, τ) induces a unique probability distribution for (L, hn).
When X is a random variable, we denote Eµ,σ,τ [X] its expectation with respect to this
probability.
In this paper, player 1 is risk-neutral. His payoff in Gn(µ) is then the expected value
of his final portfolio, up to the normalization factor 1√
n
that will be explained in the fore-
coming remark:
g1(σ, τ) = Eµ,σ,τ

 1√
n
n∑
q=1
uq(L− pq)

 (1)
The particularity of the current paper is that we consider a risk-averse player 2. The payoff
he aims to minimize (we keep the formalism of the zero-sum games where player 2 is a
minimizer) is then:
g2(σ, τ) = Eµ,σ,τ

H

 1√
n
n∑
q=1
uq(L− pq)



 (2)
where H is a risk aversion function (convex and increasing).
Remark 3. The normalization factor 1√
n
introduced in the payoff functions requires some
explanations. In this paper, we ultimately aim to analyze the price dynamics on a market in
continuous time. We approach this continuous time market by a discrete time one, and the
market is modeled as a repeated exchange game between a market maker and an informed
player, with a large number n of repetitions. At each period, there is a maximal quantity αn
of asset 1 that can be bought or sold at the price posted by the market maker. This maximal
quantity αn measures some how the liquidity of the market: it represents the quantity of
asset R that can be exchanged at once at the market price without affecting the price. The
existence of a maximal quantity acts as a protection for the market maker against an insider
trading. Would player 2 be a single fully rational player, he would prefer avoid trading with
a more informed player 1, due to a kind of ”No trade” theorem (see Milgrom and Stokey
[1982]). Because player 2 is an aggregation of different players, some of whose are in fact
trading for liquidity reasons, he is unable to completely avoid trading and this is reflected
here by setting αn > 0.
We next argue that αn should be proportional to
1√
n
. Indeed, this appears clearly in
the model where player 2 is risk-neutral. The function H is then linear and the game can
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be considered as zero-sum. In this setting the behavior of the players is independent of αn
which is just a normalisation factor of utilities. In fact this particular game corresponds
to a natural exchange mechanism. It can be easily shown that this mechanism satisfies the
five hypothesis mentioned above, and we know from De Meyer [2010] that the value Vn of
the game is such that Vn√
n
converges to a finite quantity. This result points out that αn
should be taken proportional 1√
n
in order to stay with bounded payoffs as n increases. The
exchanged quantities will then remain bounded and in the limit converge to the quantities
exchanged in the continuous time model. This normalization has no effect on the players in
the risk-neutral case, but it has to be introduced in the risk-averse case: the lotteries player
2 is facing are of the same magnitude for all n.
Throughout this paper, we will make the following regularity assumptions on µ and H:
A1: µ is a probability measure on [0, 1] absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure. Its density function fµ is strictly positive and C
1.
A2: H is a strictly positive, strictly convex and C2 function and H ′ is Lipschitz-
continuous: there exists strictly positive ǫ and K such that for all x ∈ R : ǫ < H ′(x) < K.
Observe that in A1 we assume that L takes only values in the [0, 1] interval. We could
obviously change this assumption to any compact interval by just a renormalization.
The game analyzed in this paper is in fact quite simple and much simpler than the
general games with abstract strategy spaces considered in [De Meyer, 2010]. However our
proofs are very long and we have to apologize for the technicality of the following pages.
The difficulties in the proofs come from different reasons.
The first difficulty is that strategies of the players in the game with n rounds of trading
are defined on different spaces. For example we will identify Player 1’s strategy set with
the set of probabilities on {−1,+1}n × R. Is it therefore quiet difficult to speak of the
convergence of those strategies. We bypass this difficulty using embedding methods a` la
Skorokod, which are per se technical.
Next, equilibria in the finite game are defined implicitly as a fixed point, and there are
no closed form formula to describe them. Proving the convergence of these equilibria is not
straightforward.
Finally, we prove that the convergence is equivalent to the uniqueness of solution to a
differential system with very strong nonlinearities. Those nonlinearity involve in particular
the arbitrary risk aversion functionH and the arbitrary density function fµ. This differential
system is not covered by the classical literature on differential equations.
Due to the length of these proofs, we decided to make a first synthetic overview of the
argument in the next section.
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4 Results and structure of the paper
In the first part of the paper (sections 5, 6, 7), we analyse the game Gn(µ) for a fixed
number n of stages. We first prove in section 5 that some equilibria of Gn(µ) can be found
among the equilibria of the simpler game Gn(µ) where the informed player 1 does not
observe the actions of player 2, and player 2 is not allowed to randomize his moves. We
then focus on the reduced game Gn(µ).
We show in section 6 that this game can be completely reformulated: a strategy of
player 1 can be identified with a probability Πn on the pair (ω,L) where ω = (u1, . . . , un).
We prove in subsection 6.2 that at an equilibrium,
∑
ukpk√
n
should be equal to Ψn(Sn(ω))
where Ψn is a convex function and Sn(ω) :=
1√
n
∑n
k=1 uk. The function Ψn can be used to
parameterized player 2’s strategies. Indeed, player 2’s strategy (p1, . . . , pn) can be recovered
from Ψn. A pair of strategies can therefore be described by a pair (Πn,Ψn).
We further show in the same subsection that, in order to be an equilibrium in Gn(µ),
(Πn,Ψn) must satisfy the following conditions (C1) to (C4), where Πn denotes the marginal
of Πn on (L,Sn), where λn denotes the uniform probability on ω and where λn is the law
of Sn(ω) when ω ∼ λn.
(C1): Eλn [Ψn(Sn)] = 0.
(C2): The marginal distribution Πn|L of L under Πn is µ.
(C3): Πn(L ∈ ∂Ψn(Sn)) = 1 where ∂Ψn denotes the subgradient of the convex function
Ψn.
(C4): The marginal distribution Πn|Sn of Sn under Πn, denoted νn, is such that the
density ∂λn
∂νn
is proportional to EΠn [H
′(LSn −Ψn(Sn)) | Sn].
Conversely, one can always associate an equilibrium to a pair (Πn,Ψn) satisfying the four
conditions. We prove in the subsection 6.3 our first main result that claims the existence
of a unique equivalent martingale measure as announced in the intorduction.
Theorem. Let (Πn,Ψn) be a pair satisfying the conditions (C1) to (C4), (p
n
q )q=1,...,n be
the price process that corresponds to Ψn and Πn|ω denote the marginal distribution of ω
under Πn. Then λn is the unique probability equivalent to Πn|ω such that the price process
(pnq )q=1,...,n is a martingale when (u1, . . . , un) is λn-distributed.
This theorem justifies the following terminology: the law of the price process under λn
is referred to as the martingale equivalent probability in the sequel of the paper.
We next deal in section 7 with the problem of existence of these reduced equilibria.
This existence could possibly be proved by classical methods and approximations, using
Nash-Glicksberg’s theorem. One of the interest of our alternative proof is to introduce an
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operator Tλ : ∆(R) to ∆(R). This operator is the central tool to study the asymptotic
properties of these equilibria.
To define this operator Tλ, we first focus on conditions (C1) to (C3): for any measures
λ and ν on R, there exists a unique pair (Πν ,Ψν,λ) satisfying (C1) with λn replaced by
λ, (C2), (C3) and such that the marginal distribution of Sn under Πν is ν. Indeed, due
to Fenchel lemma, condition (C3) can heuristically be interpreted by saying that Sn is an
increasing function4 g of L: Sn = g(L). When L is µ-distributed, g(L) must have distribu-
tion νn. There is essentially a unique increasing function g which satisfies that condition
5
and we find therefore heuristically that L = Ψ′n(Sn) = g−1(Sn). This determines Πn which
is then the joint law of (L, g(L)) when L is µ-distributed. This also determines Ψn up to a
constant which can be found in a unique way to satisfy (C1).
We are next seeking a measure ν that further satisfy (C4). There exists a unique
probability ρ such that ∂ρ
∂ν
is proportional to EΠν [H
′(LS − Ψν,λ(S)) | S], since H ′ > 0.
Call Tλ the map ν → Tλ(ν) := ρ. With these notations, finding an equilibrium in Gn(ν) is
equivalent to find a measure ν satisfying the equation:
Tλn(ν) = λn (3)
The existence of equilibrium in the game Gn(µ) is finally proved in section 7 by showing
that the operator Tλn is onto the space of measures. We first prove the continuity of the
operator Tλn in term of Wasserstein distance W2. The onto property of Tλn results then
from an application of the KKM theorem. Our second main results follows:
Theorem. There exists a Nash equilibrium in Gn(µ), and therefore there also exists an
equilibrium in the original game Gn(µ).
In the sequel of the paper, we focus on the equilibrium strategy of player 2, refereed
to as the price process, and its properties when players play more and more frequently.
In order to analyze the asymptotics of the price process, we have first to prove that any
sequence νn converges (in Wasserstein distance W2), where for all n, νn is a the solution of
equation (3)
Section 8 of the paper is devoted this proof. Remember that λn is the law of
1√
n
∑n
q=1 uq
when uq are independent and centered. Due to the central limit theorem, λn converges to
the normal law that we denote λ∞. On the other hand, using a compactness argument, we
can prove that any such sequence (νn)n∈N has an accumulation point ν satisfying
Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞. (4)
We then prove that there is a unique solution to this equation. This implies obviously
that the sequence (νn)n∈N converges. To prove the above uniqueness result, we first prove
4We remain very heuristical in our explanation at this point because ∂Ψ♯n is actually a correspondence
and not a single valued function.
5Would ν have no atom, we would have g(ℓ) = F−1ν (Fµ(ℓ)), where Fµ and Fν are the cumulative distri-
bution functions of µ and ν.
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that a solution to (4) should also be a solution to the differential problem (D) of Proposition
29 which results to have a unique solution (see Theorem 30).
As shown in 9, the convergence of νn implies the convergence of the law of the price
process under the martingale equivalent measure, i.e. when (u1, . . . , un) ∼ λn. More specif-
ically, the discrete time price process (pn1 , . . . , p
n
n) can be represented by the continuous time
price process t→ pn⌊nt⌋, were ⌊nt⌋ is the integer part of nt. We first show that the processes
pn⌊nt⌋ under the law λn can be represented (Skorokhod embedding) on the natural filtration
F of a Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω˜,F , P˜ ). Indeed, there exists a sequence
of variables (p˜nq )q∈{1,...,n} and an increasing sequence of stopping times (τnq )q∈{1,...,n} such
that p˜nq is Fτqn-mesurable, and has the same distribution as p
n
q when (u1, . . . , un) ∼ λn. We
show in Theorem 35 that p˜n⌊nt⌋ converges in finite dimensional distribution to a limit process
Zt defined on the space (Ω˜,F , P˜ ) and that results to be a CMMV.
This is our third important result:
Theorem. Let (pnq )q∈{1,...,n} be an equilibrium strategy in the reduced game Gn(µ). As n
goes to infinity, the law of the stochastic process t→ pn⌊nt⌋ under λn (i.e. when (u1, . . . , un) ∼
λn) converges to the law of a continuous martingale of maximal variation Zt.
We also show the convergence of the historical law of pn⌊nt⌋ (i.e. when (u1, . . . , un) are
distributed according to the equilibrium strategy of player 1) and we finally prove that this
limit law is equivalent to the law of the CMMV Zt.
5 Reduced equilibrium
Definition 4. The reduced game Gn(µ) is the game where player 1 does not observe player
2’s actions and player 2 is not allowed to randomize his moves (he only uses pure strategies).
The aim of this section is to prove Proposition 7. It states that any equilibrium in Gn(µ)
is an equilibrium in Gn(µ).
In this paper a pure strategy of player 2 will be denoted p. Such a strategy p is thus a
vector (p1, . . . , pn) where pq is a map Hq−1 → R. pq(hq−1) denotes then the deterministic
action taken by player 2 after history hq−1. Remark however that since player 2 does not
randomize before stage q, the action he will take at stage q is just a deterministic function
of previous moves of player 1. Therefore, in this paper, a pure strategy of player 2 will be
considered as a sequence (p1, . . . , pn) where pq is a function {−1,+1}q−1 → R.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 hereafter is that to any mixed strategy of player 2, he will
prefer the corresponding ”average” pure strategy. More precisely, let σ be a reduced strategy
of player 1 and let τ be any strategy of player 2. Since player 1 does not observe player
2’s move when using σ, one can assume that he picks his actions u1, . . . , un after observing
L and before player 2’s first move. (µ, σ) induces thus a probability on (L, u1, . . . , un).
Player 2’s strategy τ can then be viewed as a device to randomly chose (p1, . . . , pn) once
(u1, . . . , un) has been selected: one first select p1 with the lottery τ1, then one selects p2
with the lottery τ2(u1, p1) and so on. Therefore τ determines the conditional law of pq
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given (u1, . . . , uq−1) and this conditionnal law does not depend on σ. Let f τq (u1, . . . , uq−1)
denote the expected value of this conditional law. Note that pτ := (f
τ
1 , . . . , f
τ
n) is then a
pure strategy for player 2 since it does not depend on σ. We have thus:
Eµ,σ,τ [pq | u1, . . . , uq−1] = f τq (u1, . . . , uq−1).
Observe also that the law of pq given (u1, . . . , uq−1) is just the law of pq given (u1, . . . , un, L).
Indeed, given (u1, . . . , uq−1), pq must clearly be independent of (uq, . . . , un, L) since (uq, . . . , un, L)
was chosen before pq and τq just depends on (u1, . . . , uq−1). Therefore
Eµ,σ,τ [pq | u1, . . . , un, L] = f τq (u1, . . . , uq−1).
We now compare the payoffs induced by a strategy τ with those induced by the corre-
sponding strategy pτ .
Lemma 5. For any τ a strategy of player 2, pτ is such that for all reduced strategy σ of
player : {
g2(σ, τ) ≥ g2(σ, pτ )
g1(σ, τ) = g1(σ, pτ )
Proof. To simplify notations, the expectation Eµ,σ,τ is denoted E.
g2(σ, τ) = E[H(
n∑
q=1
uq(L− pq))] = E[E[H(
n∑
q=1
uq(L− pq)) | u1, . . . , un, L]]
We now apply Jensen’s inequality to the convex function H, and take into account the
fact that uq and L are (u1, . . . , un, L)-measurable:
g2(σ, τ) ≥ E[H(E[
∑n
q=1 uq(L− pq) | u1, . . . , un, L])]
= E[H(
∑n
q=1 uq(L− E[pq | u1, . . . , un, L]))]
= E[H(
∑n
q=1 uq(L− f τq (u1, . . . , uq−1)))]
= g2(σ, pτ )
Similarly, we have:
g1(σ, τ) =Eµ,σ,τ [uq(L− pq)]
=Eµ,σ,τ [
n∑
q=1
uq(L− Eτ [pq | u1, . . . , uq−1])]
=Eµ,σ,τ [
n∑
q=1
uq(L− f τq (u1, . . . , uq−1))]
=g1(σ, pτ )
We also will need the following lemma:
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Lemma 6. Let p be a pure strategy of player 2 and σ any strategy of player 1 (even non
reduced). Then, there exists a reduced strategy of player 1 denoted σ˜(σ,p) which gives him
the same payoff as σ against p, i.e. :
g1(σ˜(σ,p), p) = g1(σ, p)
Proof. The strategy σ is not reduced, so σq depends on (u1, . . . , uq−1, p1, . . . , pq−1). But
player 2 is completely deterministic since he uses strategy p. Therefore he plays action
pq = pq(u1, . . . , uq−1), and the whole history p1, . . . , pq−1 is just a deterministic function of
u1, . . . , uq−2. In the arguments of σq, we can replace p1, . . . , pq−1 by this function and we
get in this way:
σ˜(σ,p),q(u1, . . . , uq−1) := σ(u1, . . . , uq−1, p1, . . . , pq−1(u1, . . . , uq−2))
which is a reduced strategy and clearly: g1(σ˜(σ,p), p) = g1(σ, p)
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Proposition 7. If (σ⋆, p⋆) is an equilibrium in Gn(µ), then (σ
⋆, p⋆) is an equilibrium in
Gn(µ).
Proof. For all player 2’s strategy τ in Gn(µ), we have:
g2(σ
⋆, p⋆) ≤ g2(σ⋆, pτ ) ≤ g2(σ⋆, τ)
where pτ is defined as above. Indeed the first inequality just indicates that the pure strategy
pτ is not a profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy p
⋆ in Gn(µ). The second
inequality comes from Lemma 5.
Let σ be any strategy of player 1. With the notation of Lemma 6 we get:
g1(σ, p
⋆) = g1(σ˜(σ,p⋆), p
⋆) ≤ g1(σ⋆, p⋆)
where the inequality follows from the fact that σ˜ is a reduced strategy and can thus not
be a profitable deviation from σ⋆ for player 1.
Based on the previous proposition, equilibria in Gn(µ) will be referred to as the reduced
equilibria in Gn(µ). In the sequel of this paper, we will only focus on the reduced equilibria
of Gn(µ).
6 Characterisation of equilibrium
In subsection 6.1 we give an other representation of the strategy spaces in Gn(µ). This
representation is needed in subsection 6.2, where we provide necessary and sufficient equi-
librium conditions.
Finally, in subsection 6.3, we prove that the price process posted by player 2 in any
equilibrium is a martingale when the past actions of player 1 are uniformly distributed.
Moreover, we prove that the uniform distribution is the only probability on player 1’s
actions under which the price process becomes a martingale.
12
6.1 Alternative representation of the strategy spaces
When playing a reduced strategy player 1 does not observe player 2’s actions and we
can therefore assume that he selects his actions after getting the information L and before
the first move of player 2. Thus, joint with µ, a reduced strategy σ induces a joint law Πn
on (L,ω) where ω = (u1, . . . , un) belongs to Ωn := {−1,+1}n. The marginal Πn|L of Πn on
L is clearly µ. We can further recover the strategy σ from Πn computing the conditional
probabilities given L. Therefore the player 1’s strategy space may be viewed as the set of
probabilities Πn in ∆(R× Ωn) such that Πn|L = µ.
We first prove that player 2’s strategy space in Gn(µ) can be identified with a set Xn of
random variables.
Let us consider the set of pure strategies P of player 2. If p ∈ P, then pq is a function
Ωn → R which is measurable with respect to (u1, . . . , uq−1). Note that the strategy p only
appears in the payoff functions (see equations 1 and 2) thought the quantity Xn,p(ω) :=
1√
n
∑n
q=1 uqpq(ω). We can therefore identify the strategy space of player 2 with the set
Xn := {Xn,p|p ∈ P} ⊂ RΩ.
Next lemma characterizes this set. Let λn be the uniform probability on Ωn. Under λn,
(uq)q=1,...,n are mutually independent, and have zero expectation. We denote L
1(λn) the
set L1(Ωn,P(Ωn), λn) which is just R
Ωn since Ωn is finite.
Lemma 8. Xn = {X ∈ L1(λn) | Eλn [X] = 0}
Proof. Let X ∈ Xn. Then X = Xn,p for some p ∈ P. Since Ωn is a finite set, X as a map
from Ωn to R belongs to L
1(λn). Moreover, using that pq is (u1, . . . , uq−1) measurable:
Eλn

 1√
n
n∑
q=1
uqpq

 = E

 1√
n
n∑
q=1
Eλn [uqpq|u1, . . . , uq−1]

 = E

 1√
n
n∑
q=1
pqEλn [uq]

 = 0
We thus have proved that Xn ⊆ {X ∈ L1(λn) | Eλn [X] = 0}.
Assume next that X ∈ L1(λn) is such that Eλn [X] = 0. For k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, we denote
Xk(u1, . . . , uk) := Eλn [X | u1, . . . , uk]. Let 1{uk=1} denotes the random variable that takes
the value 1 if uk = 1 and 0 otherwise. An easy computation shows that 1{uk=1} =
uq+1
2 .
One gets therefore
Xk(u1, . . . , uk) = 1{uk=1}X
k(u1, . . . , uk − 1, 1) + 1{uk=−1}Xk(u1, . . . , uk − 1,−1)
=
uk + 1
2
Xk(u1, . . . , uk−1, 1) +
1− uk
2
Xk(u1, . . . , uk−1,−1)
=
ukpk(ω)√
n
+
Xk(u1, . . . , uk−1, 1) +Xk(u1, . . . , uk−1,−1)
2
,
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where:
pk(ω) :=
Xk(u1, . . . , uk−1, 1)−Xk(u1, . . . , uk−1,−1)
2/
√
n
(5)
Now observe that
Xk−1(u1, . . . , uk−1) = Eλn [Xk|u1, . . . , uk−1]
=
Xk(u1,...,uk−1,1)+Xk(u1,...,uk−1,−1)
2
Therefore Xk(u1, . . . , uk)−Xk−1(u1, . . . , uk−1) = ukpk(ω)√n .
Summing up those equalities for k = 1 to n, we get:
Xn(u1, . . . , un) =
∑n
k=1 ukpk(ω)√
n
+X0
But Xn(u1, . . . , un) = X and X0 = Eλ(X) = 0. We get thus:
X =
∑n
k=1 ukpk(ω)√
n
= Xn,p,
for the strategy p defined in (5).
Let us make more precise the relation between X and the strategy p such that X = Xn,p.
Proposition 9. Let X ∈ Xn. There exists a unique pure reduced strategy p such that
X = Xn,p. Moreover, we have the explicit formula:
pq(u1, . . . , uq−1) =
√
nEλn [uqX | u1, . . . , uq−1] (6)
Proof. Let pj be (u1, . . . , uj−1)-measurable. Then observe that if j < q:
Eλn [pjuquj |u1, . . . , uq−1] = pjujEλn [uq|u1, . . . , uq−1] = 0
On the other hand, if j > q,
Eλn [pjuquj|u1, . . . , uq−1] =Eλn [Eλn [pjuquj |u1, . . . , uj−1]|u1, . . . , uq−1]
=Eλn [pjuqEλn [uj |u1, . . . , uj−1]|u1, . . . , uq−1]
=0
We get thus Eλn [pjuquj |u1, . . . , uq−1] = pq if j = q and 0 otherwise. Let now X be in Xn.
According to the previous lemma, X = Xn,p for some p. We can therefore write Eλn [uqX |
u1, . . . , uq−1] = Eλn [uq
∑n
i=1 piui√
n
| u1, . . . , uq−1] = 1√n
∑n
i=1Eλn [piuqui | u1, . . . , uq−1] =
pq√
n
as announced.
We can now reformulate the completely reduced game Gn(µ) as follow: player 1 selects
Πn ∈ ∆(Ωn × R) such that Πn|L = µ. Simultaneously player 2 chooses X ∈ Xn.
The payoff functions are now given by the formula:{
g1(Πn,X) = EΠn [LSn −X]
g2(Πn,X) = EΠn [H(LSn −X)]
where Sn(ω) =
1√
n
∑n
q=1 uq.
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6.2 Characterization of equilibrium strategies in Gn(µ)
The main result of this subsection is Corollary 14 that provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for a pair (Π⋆n,X
⋆) to be an equilibrium in Gn(µ).
As a first step in the proof of that result, we prove in Proposition 10 that any history
ω = (u1, . . . , un) has a positive probability at equilibrium. We express this property saying
that the equilibrium strategy Π⋆n of player 1 is completely mixed.
We next argue in Proposition 11 that if a strategy X of player 2 is such that there exists
a completely mixed best response of player 1, then X has a very particular form: X(ω) is
a convex function of Sn(ω).
The next result is Proposition 12. It claims that if player 2 plays a strategy X = Ψn(Sn)
for a convex function Ψ then Πn is a best response to X if and only if Πn(L ∈ ∂Ψn(Sn)) = 1,
where ∂Ψn is the subgradient of the convex function Ψn, as defined in equation (7).
Finally the first order condition for Player 2’s strategy Ψ(Sn) are derived in Proposition
13.
Proposition 10. If player 2 has a best reply to a strategy Π⋆n of player 1 in Gn(µ) then Π
⋆
n
is completely mixed.
Proof. Π⋆n is a probability on (L,ω) where ω = (u1, . . . , un). It induces therefore a marginal
distribution on ωq = (u1, . . . , uq). Denote Γq the set of ωq such that Π
⋆
n(ωq) > 0. We want
to prove that Γn = Ωn. Assume on the contrary that Γn 6= Ωn. We can then define q⋆ as the
smallest q such that Γq 6= Ωq := {−1,+1}q . There is then a history (u1, . . . , uq⋆−1) ∈ Γq⋆−1
such that one of the histories (u1, . . . , uq⋆−1, 1) or (u1, . . . , uq⋆−1,−1) does not belong to Γ⋆q .
Whence, this history (u1, . . . , uq⋆−1) has a positive probability under Π⋆n and is followed
by a deterministic move of player 1 at stage q⋆. But after observing this history, player 2
could increase his benefit by posting a higher or lower price according to the forecoming
deterministic move of player 1. This contradicts the hypothesis that there is a best reply
against Π⋆n. Therefore, assuming Γn 6= Ωn leads to a contradiction.
The following notions are classical and useful concept to deal with convex functions:
The subgradient ∂Ψ(s) of a convex function Ψ at s is defined as:
∂Ψ(s) = {ℓ|∀z : Ψ(z) ≥ Ψ(s) + ℓ(z − s)}. (7)
The Fenchel transform of Ψ is defined as the convex function Ψ♯(x):
Ψ♯(x) := sup
s∈R
xs−Ψ(s). (8)
As well known (see Rockafellar [1970]), if Ψ is lower semi-continuous, then Ψ = (Ψ♯)♯.
Furthermore, we have the following equivalence due to Fenchel:
x ∈ ∂Ψ(s)⇔ xs = Ψ(s) + Ψ♯(x)⇔ s ∈ ∂Ψ♯(x). (9)
We are now ready to state our next result:
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Proposition 11. If player 1 has a completely mixed best reply Π⋆n to a strategy X
⋆ of player
2 in Gn(µ), then X
⋆ = Ψn(Sn(ω)) where Ψn is a convex function such that Eλn [Ψn(Sn)] = 0.
We further have Ψn = A
♯ where
A(ℓ) := max
ω′∈Ωn
ℓSn(ω
′)−X⋆(ω′). (10)
Proof. Suppose that player 2 is playing X⋆ and player 1 wants to maximize his payoff
EΠn [LS −X⋆]. After observing L = ℓ, he will select an history ω ∈ Vℓ where Vℓ is the set
of ω′ that solve the maximization problem A(ℓ) in equation (10).
Therefore
Π⋆n(ω ∈ VL) = 1. (11)
Since all history ω has a positive probability under Π⋆n we conclude that the set of values
ℓ such that ω ∈ Vℓ can not be empty. Otherwise ω would never be selected by player 1 and
would have zero probability under Π⋆n.
Now remark that it follows from the definition of A that for all ℓ and for all ω:
A(ℓ) ≥ ℓSn(ω)−X⋆(ω) (12)
Therefore, for all ω, for all ℓ:
X⋆(ω) ≥ ℓSn(ω)−A(ℓ)
and thus for all ω:
X⋆(ω) ≥ sup
ℓ∈R
ℓSn(ω)−A(ℓ).
As observed above, for all ω, the set of ℓ such that ω ∈ Vℓ is not empty.
For those ℓ, inequality (12) is an equality, and thus:
X⋆(ω) = sup
ℓ∈R
ℓSn(ω)−A(ℓ).
We get therefore X⋆(ω) = Ψn(Sn(ω)) with Ψn(s) = A
♯(s). Observe that as supremum
of affine functions of s, the map s→ Ψn(s) is convex.
Finally, since X ∈ Xn we get with Lemma 8 that Eλn [Ψn(Sn(ω))] = 0.
With this notation, we have the following result:
Proposition 12. Consider the strategy X⋆(ω) = Ψn(Sn(ω)) of last proposition. A strategy
Πn of player 1 is a best response to X
⋆ if and only if:
Πn(L ∈ ∂Ψn(Sn)) = 1.
Proof. As explained in the beginning of the previous proof, Πn is a best response to X
⋆ if
and only if Πn(ω ∈ VL) = 1. It follows from the definition of Vℓ that ω ∈ Vℓ if and only
if A(ℓ) = Sn(ω)ℓ −X(ω). On the other hand, it follows from the definition (10) of A that
for all r, A(r) ≥ Sn(ω)r − X(ω). Combining these two relations, we have that A(r) ≥
S(ω)(r − ℓ) + A(ℓ) and thus S(ω) ∈ ∂A(ℓ) or equivalently ℓ ∈ ∂A♯(Sn(ω)) = ∂Ψn(Sn(ω)).
Therefore ω ∈ Vℓ if and only if ℓ ∈ ∂Ψn(Sn(ω)), and the proposition is prooved.
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The next proposition expresses the first order conditions of player 2 optimization prob-
lem. Π⋆
n|ω just denotes the marginal distribution of ω under Π
⋆
n.
Proposition 13. A strategy X⋆ is a best reply to a strategy Π⋆n of player 1, if and only if
λn has a density with respect to Π
⋆
n|ω given by the formula:
dλn
dΠ⋆
n|ω
= αnEΠ⋆n [H
′(LSn −X⋆n) | ω]
for a constant αn.
Proof. Suppose that X⋆ is a best reply to a strategy Π⋆n of player 1. Then X
⋆ is a solution
to the minimization problem of player 2:
min
X∈Xn
EΠ⋆n [H(LSn −X)].
Note that the map X → EΠ⋆n [H(LSn − X)] is convex in X and we are in front of
a convex minimization problem. In such a problem the first order conditions are both
necessary and sufficient. We get these first order conditions considering for fixed δ ∈ Xn
the map G : ǫ ∈ R → G(ǫ) := EΠ⋆n(H(LSn −X⋆ + ǫδ)). This map must reach a minimum
at ǫ = 0.
Observe now that H is C1 and so is G. We get then G′(0) = EΠ⋆n [H
′(LSn −X⋆)δ], and
therefore, for all δ ∈ Xn:
EΠ⋆n [H
′(LSn −X⋆)δ] = 0
Since δ is just a function of ω, this equality can also be written as:
0 = EΠ⋆n [E[H
′(LSn −X⋆n)δ|ω]] = EΠ⋆n [δYn]
where Yn(ω) := EΠ⋆n [H
′(LSn −Xn,⋆) | ω]. Yn(ω) > 0 because H ′ > ǫ > 0 according to
A2.
Since λn puts a positive weight on every history, Π
⋆
n|ω is absolutely continuous with
respect to λn and has a density yn =
dΠ⋆
n|ω
dλn
.
We can rephrase previous conditions as: for all δ ∈ Xn,
Eλn [ynYnδ] = 0
This relation can interpreted as an orthogonality relation in L2(λn) with the scalar
product 〈A,B〉 := Eλn [AB]. The space Xn must then be orthogonal to ynYn. But Lemma 8
shows that Xn = {1}⊥. Therefore ynYn is co-linear with 1: it is equal to a positive constant
that we denote 1
αn
.
Since yn =
dΠ⋆
n|ω
dλn
> 0, λn is absolutely continuous with respect to Π
⋆
n|ω and we get
dλn
dΠ⋆
n|ω
= 1
yn
= αnYn.
Corollary 14. A pair of strategy (Π⋆n,X
⋆) is an equilibrium in Gn(µ) if and only if ∀ω :
X⋆(ω) = Ψ⋆n(Sn(ω)), where Ψ
⋆
n is a convex function that jointly satisfy with Π
⋆
n the following
conditions (C1),(C2),(C3),(C4).
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

(C1) Ψ∗n is such that Eλn [Ψ∗n(Sn(ω)] = 0
(C2) Π⋆
n|L = µ
(C3) Π⋆n(L ∈ ∂Ψn(Sn)) = 1
(C4) ∂λn
∂Π⋆
n|ω
= αnEΠ⋆n [H
′(LSn −Ψ⋆n(Sn))|ω] where αn is a constant
From now on, a pair (Π⋆n,Ψ
∗
n) satisfying (C1),(C2),(C3),(C4) will be referred to as
an equilibrium in Gn(µ) (instead of the pair (Π
⋆
n,X
∗), with X∗ := Ψ∗n(Sn).)
Remember that according to the results of section 6.1, such a pair (Π⋆n,Ψ
∗
n) fully de-
scribes a pair of equilibrium strategies (σ∗, τ∗) in the original game Gn(µ).
6.3 The price process and the martingale equivalent measure
Before proving the existence of equilibrium in section 7, let us emphasize that the above
characterization of equilibrium implies that under an appropriate equivalent measure the
price process is a martingale.
Consider an equilibrium (Π⋆n,Ψ
⋆
n), and denote p1, p2(u1), . . . , pn(u1, . . . , un−1) the cor-
responding pure strategy of player 2.
When (u1, . . . , un) are randomly selected by player 1 with lottery Π
⋆
n, the law of this
process p is called the historical law. We now prove that if (u1, . . . , un) are selected by the
lottery λn, the process is a martingale.
Theorem 15. The price process (pnq )q=1,...,n is a martingale under the probability λn.
Proof. With equation (6) we have:
pnq (u1, . . . , uq−1) =
√
nEλn [uqX
⋆ | u1, . . . , uq−1]
=
√
nEλn [uqΨn(Sn) | u1, . . . , uq−1]
=
√
nEλn [unΨn(Sn) | u1, . . . , uq−1] (13)
The last equality follows from the fact that, conditionally to u1, . . . , uq−1, the vector
(uq, Sn) and (un, Sn) have the same law under λn. The price process p
n is written as a
conditional expectation of a terminal variable with respect to an increasing sequence of
σ-algebras. It is then a martingale under the probability λn.
We further aim to prove that λn is the unique probability on Ωn that makes the price
process a martingale.
Theorem 16. λn is the unique probability on Ωn that makes the price process (pq)q=1,...,n
a martingale.
Proof. Indeed, let λ˜n be a probability on Ωn under which the price process is a martingale.
We find with the similar computation as that made to get equation (6) that:
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pq(u1, . . . , uq−1) =
uq + 1
2
pq(u1, . . . , uq−2, 1) +
uq − 1
2
pq(u1, . . . , uq−2,−1)
Since p is a martingale under λn, we find
pq(u1,...,1)+pq(u1,...,−1)
2 = pq−1(u1, . . . , uq−2)
And thus
pq(u1, . . . , uq−1) = pq−1(u1, . . . , uq−2) + cq(u1, . . . , uq−2)uq−1
where cq =
pq(u1,...,1)−pq(u1,...,−1)
2 . Lemma 40 proved in Annex 11.1, indicates that cq > 0.
So if p is a martingale under λ˜n, we must have for all q: Eλ˜n [uq−1|u1, . . . , uq−2] = 0.
Therefore λ˜n = λn.
7 Existence of equilibrium
In this section we aim to prove the existence of an equilibrium in Gn(µ). According to
section 5, we can focus on the game Gn(µ). According to Corollary 14 we just have to
prove the existence of a pair (Πn,Ψn) such that conditions (C1) to (C4) are satisfied.
These conditions on (Πn,Ψn) lead to new conditions on (Πn,Ψn) where Πn ∈ ∆(R2) is
the marginal of Πn on (L,Sn). As explained in the next subsection, there corresponds an
equilibrium (Πn,Ψn) to a pair (Πn,Ψn) satisfying these new conditions. We therefore will
focus on these pairs (Πn,Ψn).
7.1 The marginal Πn
Πn is a probability on Ωn×R and it induces a marginal law Πn ∈ ∆(R2) for the pair (Sn, L).
(C1), (C2) and (C3) are in fact conditions on (Πn,Ψn). (C4) is the unique condition that
involves the conditional law of L given ω. As proved with the first claim of the forthcoming
Lemma 17, it turns out that (C4) implies the following necessary condition on Πn and Ψn:
(C4’): There exists a constant αn such that
∂λn
∂Πn|S
= αnEΠn [H
′(LSn −Ψn(Sn))|Sn]
It is useful to note that various equilibria (Πn,Ψn) could have the same marginal Πn.
On the other hand, we will prove in Corollary 26 the existence of pairs (Πn,Ψn) that satisfy
(C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4’). To prove the existence of reduced equilibrium in Gn(µ) we
therefore need the second claim of the next lemma:
Lemma 17.
1/ Any reduced equilibrium (Πn,Ψn) in Gn(µ) is such that (Πn,Ψn) satisfies (C1), (C2),
(C3) and (C4’), where Πn = Πn|(L,Sn).
2/ Conversely, to any (Πn,Ψn) satisfying (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4’), there corresponds
at least one equilibrium (Πn,Ψn) such that Πn|(L,Sn) = Πn.
19
Proof. We start with the first claim. We just have to prove that (C4) implies (C4’). Let
Φ be a continuous and bounded function. According to (C3) we have:
Eλn [Φ(Sn(ω))] =EΠn|ω [Φ(Sn(ω))
dλn
dΠn|ω
]
=EΠn [Φ(Sn(ω))αnEΠn [H
′(LSn −Ψn(Sn))|ω]]
=EΠn [Φ(Sn(ω))αnH
′(LSn −Ψn(Sn))]
=EΠn [Φ(Sn(ω))αnEΠn [H
′(LSn −Ψn(Sn))|Sn]]
Therefore Eλn [Φ(Sn)] = Eλn [Φ(Sn(ω))] = EΠn|S [Φ(Sn(ω))αnEΠn [H
′(LSn − Ψn(Sn)|Sn]]
which is exactly our condition (C4’).
We now prove the second claim. Let (Πn,Ψn) satisfy (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4’).
Consider then the probability Πn induced by the following lottery: select first L and Sn
according to Πn. If Sn = s, select an history ω with the uniform probability on the set
Ks = {ω|Sn(ω) = s}.
The marginal of Πn on (L,Sn) coincides with Πn and (Πn,Ψn) satisfies therefore (C1),
(C2) and (C3).
Observe then that under Πn, L is then independent of ω given Sn and therefore the
conditional law of (L,Sn) given ω coincides with the conditional law of (L,Sn) given Sn.
So: EΠn [H
′(LSn − Ψn(Sn))|ω] = EΠn [H ′(LSn − Ψn(Sn))|Sn], and (C4) then follows from
(C4’).
7.2 Reformulation of (C1), (C2) and (C3)
In this subsection we show that a pair (Πn,Ψn) satisfying (C1), (C2) and (C3) is com-
pletely determined by the marginal law ν := Πn|Sn of Sn.
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation: ∆(R2, µ, ν) is the set of prob-
ability distributions on (L,Sn) ∈ R2 with respective marginal laws µ and ν.
Definition 18. For ν ∈ ∆(R), we define φν(ℓ) := F−1ν (Fµ(ℓ)) and γν(s) := F−1µ (Fν(s))
where Fµ and Fν are the cumulative distribution functions of µ and ν, and F
−1
µ and F
−1
ν
are their right inverses i.e. F−1ν (y) = inf{x | Fν(x) > y}.
We further define:
Γν(s) :=
∫ s
0
γν(t)dt (14)
Φν(ℓ) :=
∫ ℓ
0
φν(t)dt (15)
We denote Πν the law of the pair (L, φν(L)) when L is µ-distributed.
Finally, for λ ∈ ∆(R), we set:
Ψν,λ(s) := Γν(s)− Eλ[Γν ] (16)
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Lemma 19. Let (Π,Ψ) be a pair where Ψ is a convex function and where Π ∈ ∆(R2)
satisfies Π|Sn = ν. Then (Π,Ψ) satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3) if and only if (Π,Ψ) =
(Πν ,Ψν,λn).
Proof. We first prove that the pair (Πν ,Ψν,λn) satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3). We start
by observing that Πν ∈ ∆(R2, µ, ν). Indeed, according to the definition of Πν the marginal
law of L is µ. On the other hand, since µ has no atom, U := Fµ(L) is uniformly distributed
and it is well known that the Smirnov transform F−1ν (U) is ν-distributed. Therefore the
marginal law of Πν on Sn is just ν.
Ψν,λ is a convex function since γν is increasing and thus Γν is convex. It further satisfies
(C1) since, due to equation (16), Eλn [Ψν,λn ] = 0.
Πν satisfies (C2) since it belongs to ∆(R
2, µ, ν).
γν is right continuous and therefore it follows from the definition of Γν that ∂Ψν,λ(s) =
[γν(s
−), γν(s)] where γν(s−) is the left limit of γν at s. Under Πν , Sn = φν(L). Therefore,
condition (C3) is equivalent to:
Πν
[
γν((φν(L))
−) ≤ L ≤ γν(φν(L))
]
= 1 (17)
We first prove that for all x:
Fν((F
−1
ν (x))
−) ≤ x ≤ Fν(F−1ν (x)) (18)
Let A := {s|Fν(s) > x} and α := F−1ν (x). It results from the definition of F−1ν (x) that
α is the infimum of A. Furthermore, since Fν is increasing, ]α,∞[⊂ A ⊂ [α,∞[. Since
Fν is right continuous, we get Fν(α) = inf
s∈A
Fν(s). But if s ∈ A, Fν(s) > x, and therefore
Fν(α) = inf
s∈A
Fν(s) ≥ x and the right hand inequality in (18) is proved.
On the other hand, Fν(α
−) = limu→α,u<α Fν(u). But if u < α, u ∈ Ac and thus
Fν(u) ≤ x. Therefore Fν(α−) ≤ x which is the second inequality. Replace x by Fµ(L) in
(18) to obtain: Fν((φν(L))
−) ≤ Fµ(L) ≤ Fν(φν(L)). Since Fµ is increasing and one to one,
we get therefore F−1µ (Fν((φν(L))−)) ≤ L ≤ F−1µ (Fν(φν(L))) which is exactly (17) according
to the definition of γν , and (Πν ,Ψν,λ) satisfies thus (C3).
We now prove the converse statement. Let Πn belong to ∆(R
2, µ, ν) and Ψn be a convex
function such that (Πn,Ψn) satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3). We have to prove that (Π,Ψ) =
(Πν ,Ψν,λn)
Being convex, the function Ψn(s) has a derivative ρ(s) at any point except maybe on
a countable set. The function ρ can be extended into a right continuous function defined
for all s ∈ R. We then obtain that for all s, ∂Ψn(s) = [ρ(s−), ρ(s)]. Since ℓ ∈ ∂Ψn(s) ⇔
s ∈ ∂Ψ♯n(ℓ) we get, according to Fenchel equation (9): ∂Ψ♯n(ℓ) = [ρ−1(ℓ−), ρ−1(ℓ)] where
ρ−1(ℓ) := inf{s|ρ(s) > ℓ}.
Condition (C3) implies therefore Πn(ρ
−1(L−) ≤ Sn ≤ ρ−1(L)) = 1. Observing that ρ−1
is an increasing function, there are at most countably many points in A := {ℓ|ρ−1(ℓ−) 6=
ρ−1(ℓ)}. Since µ is non atomic, µ(A) = 0 and thus Πn[Sn = ρ−1(L)] = 1. It follows that,
under Πn, (L,Sn) has the same law as (L, ρ
−1(L)). Since Πn ∈ ∆(R2, µ, ν), we conclude
that ρ−1(L) is ν-distributed when L is µ-distributed. As observed in the beginning of this
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proof φν(L) ∼ ν when L ∼ µ. It turns out that φν is the unique right continuous increasing
function having that property6, and we may therefore conclude that ρ−1 = φν .
It follows on one hand that Πn = Πν . On the other hand, ρ = φ
−1
ν = γν . Therefore,
∂Ψn(s) = ∂Γν(s) for all s. As a consequence Ψn = Γν + c where c is a constant. Since Ψn
satisfies (C1), we conclude that c = −Eλn [Γν ] and thus Ψn = Ψν,λn as announced.
As explained in the introduction of this section, we are seeking for pairs (Πn,Ψn) satis-
fying (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4’). According to Lemma 19, this is equivalent to find ν
such that (Πν ,Ψν,λn) satisfies (C4’).
(C4’) is a condition on the density of λn with respect to the marginal of Πν|Sn = ν. It
expresses that this density ∂λn
∂ν
is proportional to Yν,λ defined as:
Yν,λ := EΠν [H
′(LSn −Ψν,λ(Sn)) | Sn] (19)
Since H ′ is strictly positive, so is Yν,λ. Therefore we define:
αν,λ :=
1
Eν [Yν,λ]
(20)
as the unique constant αν,λ such that αν,λ.Yν,λ.ν is a probability measure (the notation
αν,λ.Yν,λ.ν refers to the measure ζ such that
∂ζ
∂ν
= αν,λ.Yν,λ ).
Definition 20. For λ ∈ ∆(R), Tλ is defined as the map from ν ∈ ∆(R) to Tλ(ν) :=
αν,λ.Yν,λ.ν ∈ ∆(R), where αν,λ and Yν,λ are defined in equations (19) and (20).
With this definition, we get:
Lemma 21. For all ν, the pair (Πν ,Ψν,λn) satisfies (C4’) if and only if Tλn(ν) = λn.
Proof. This results from the definition of Tλ and the condition (C4’).
The operator Tλ is the central tool of our analysis. It is used both to prove the existence
of equilibria and to prove their convergence.
In the next subsection, we analyze the continuity property of Tλ.
7.3 Continuity of Tλ
We first introduce the Wasserstein distanceW2 and we remind some of its useful properties.
Our the continuity result for Tλ is stated in Proposition 24. Its technical proof is given in
Annex 11.2.
6Let indeed f1, f2 be two right continuous increasing functions such that fi(L) ∼ ν when L ∼ µ. Then
for all a ∈ R, Ai := {ℓ|fi(ℓ) ≥ a} is a closed set. Since fi is increasing, Ai must be an half line and we must
have therefore Ai = [αi,∞[. Since fi(L) ∼ ν and Fµ is continuous, we get:
ν([a,∞[) = µ(fi(L) ≥ a) = µ(L ≥ αi) = 1− Fµ(αi)
Therefore Fµ(α1) = Fµ(α2) and thus α1 = α2, since Fµ is strictly increasing according to the hypothesis A1
on µ. As a result, A1 = A2, or in other words: for all ℓ and for all a, f1(ℓ) ≥ a if and only if f2(ℓ) ≥ a. We
conclude therefore that f1 = f2.
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Definition 22. For d ∈ N∗, we define P2(Rd) the Wasserstein space of order 2 on Rd, as:
P2(R
d) := {ν ∈ ∆(Rd), such that
∫
Rd
‖x‖2ν(dx) <∞}
For ν1, ν2 ∈ P2(Rd) we define the Wasserstein distance between ν1 and ν2 as:
W2(ν1, ν2) =
(
inf
π∈∆(R2d,ν1,ν2)
∫
R2d
‖x− y‖2dπ(x, y)
) 1
2
W2 is clearly finite on P2(R
d) and (P2(R
d),W2) is a metric space. This metric is useful
to deal with weak convergences (as indicates Proposition 23).
Remember that a sequence νk ∈ ∆(Rd) is said to converge in law, or to convergence
weakly in ∆(Rd) to ν if and only if for any bounded continuous function φ : Rd → R, we
have Eνk [φ]→ Eν [φ] as k →∞.
There exists also a weak convergence in P2(R
d): νk converges to ν weakly in P2(R
d) if
and only if for any continuous functions φ satisfying for some constant C ∈ R: ∀x ∈ Rd,
| φ(x) |≤ C(1 + ‖x‖)2, we have that Eνk [φ]→ Eν [φ] as k →∞.
The following proposition is well known (see for instance theorem 6.9 in Villani [2008],
or Mallows [1972] for a proof). It makes the link between weak convergences and W2
convergence.
Proposition 23. The three following statements are equivalent:
1/ W2(νn, ν)→ 0
2/ νn → ν (weakly in P2(Rd))
3/ νn → ν (weakly in ∆(Rd)) and Eνn [‖s‖2]→ Eν [‖s‖2].
The continuity result is expressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 24. If νk and λk are two sequences of measure in P2(R) that converge in W2
distance to ν and λ, then W2(Tλk(νk), Tλ(ν))→ 0
The proof of this proposition is postponed to the Annex 11.2.
7.4 KKM theorem and existence of equilibrium.
We are now ready to state the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Gn(µ). According to
Lemma 17 and 21, to prove the existence of an equilibrium in Gn(µ), we have to show
that there exists νn ∈ ∆(R) such that Tλn(νn) = λn. Remember that λn ∈ ∆f (R) where
∆f (R) is the set of probability measures on R with finite support. Observe next that
Tλ(ν) is defined by a density function with respect to ν. In particular Tλ(ν) is absolutely
continuous with respect to ν, which is denoted Tλ(ν) ≪ ν (i.e. for all measurable set A,
ν(A) = 0⇒ Tλ(ν)(A) = 0). Therefore Tλ(ν) ∈ ∆f (R) if ν ∈ ∆f (R).
The next theorem can then be applied to Tλn to conclude the existence of equilibrium.
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Theorem 25. A map T : ∆f (R) → ∆f (R) that is continuous for the W2 metric and
satisfies T (ν)≪ ν for all ν is necessarily onto.
Proof. Let λ be a measure in ∆f (R) and denoteK its support. If T (ν)≪ ν, then necessarily
the support of T (ν) is included in the support of ν. Therefore T maps ∆(K) to ∆(K).
∆(K) can be identified with the |K|-dimensional simplex hereafter denoted ∆ and the
restriction of T to ∆ is a continuous map. It further preserves the faces Fi := {x ∈ ∆|xi =
0}. It follows from an argument used in Gale [1984] that T is onto. Indeed, let λ ∈ ∆ and
define Ci := {x ∈ ∆|T (x)i ≤ λi}. Since T is continuous, Ci is clearly a closed subset of ∆.
Furthermore, if x ∈ Fi then xi = 0 and thus T (x)i = 0 ≤ λi. We conclude therefore that for
all i, Fi ⊂ Ci. We next argue that ∆ ⊂ ∪iCi. Indeed, for all x ∈ ∆, T (x) ∈ ∆. There must
exists i such that T (x)i ≤ λi. Otherwise we would have for all i, T (x)i > λi, and summing
all those inequalities we would get 1 > 1. Therefore there exists i such that x ∈ Ci. As
announced, ∆ ⊂ ∪iCi.
According to KKM theorem (see the particular version presented in Mertens et al. [2014]
page ) there exists x ∈ ∩iCi. So for this x we get for all i that T (x)i ≤ λi. Since the sum
over i of both sides equal to 1, we infer that these inequalities are in fact equalities, and
thus T (x) = λ.
Since our map Tλn is onto, we conclude that for all n, there exists νn such that Tλn(νn) =
λn. The corresponding pair (Πνn ,Ψνn,λn) satisfies (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4’). We
conclude then with Lemma 17-2, that:
Corollary 26. There exists a reduced equilibrium in Gn(µ).
8 Convergence of νn
In order to describe the asymptotics of the price process, we have first to analyze the asymp-
totics of any sequence (νn) satisfying for all n the equation Tλn(νn) = λn. For now on, (νn)
will denote any such sequence.
First observe that λn is the law of Sn =
∑n
i=1 ui√
n
when (u1, . . . , un) are independent and
centred. It follows from the central limit theorem that λn converges in law to λ∞ := N (0, 1).
Observing that the second order moments Eλn [S
2
n] = 1 for all n, this weak convergence in
∆(R) implies (see Proposition 23) the W2-convergence of λn to λ∞.
We first prove in Lemma 27 that the sequence (νn) is relatively compact. As a conse-
quence we infer with Corollary 28 that any sequence (νn) must have an accumulation point
satisfying
Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞ (21)
It turns out that equation (21) for ν is equivalent to the claim that Ψν,λ∞ is a smooth
solution to a differential system (see Proposition 29).
We next claim in Theorem 30 that this differential problem D has a unique solution
and therefore the equation Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞ has a unique solution ν (see Corollary 31). This
implies the convergence of νn to this unique solution ν, as stated in Corollary 32.
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Lemma 27. The sequence (νn) is relatively compact: any subsequence of (νn) has an ac-
cumulation point in P2(R).
Proof. We first prove that Eνn [S
2
n] is bounded. It follows immediately from the assumptions
A2 on H as well as from the definition of Yν,λ and αν,λ (see equation (19)), that ǫ < Yν,λ <
K, and 1
K
< αν,λ <
1
ǫ
. Therefore: ǫ
K
< αν,λ.Yν,λ <
K
ǫ
. According to the definition of λn,
we have Eλn [S
2
n] = 1. And thus:
1 = Eλn [S
2
n] = ETλn(νn)
[S2n] = Eνn [ανn,λnYνn,λnS
2
n] ≥
ǫ
K
Eνn [S
2
n]
which leads to Eνn [S
2
n] ≤ Kǫ . We conclude with Markov-Tchebichev inequality that for all
η > 0, νn(S
2
n ≥ ηǫK ) ≤ η. This indicates that the sequence of measures (νn) is tight: for all
η > 0 there exists a compact set [−
√
M
η
,
√
M
η
] such that for all n, νn([−
√
M
η
,
√
M
η
]) ≥ 1−η.
This tightness property implies with Prokhorov’s theorem that there exists a subse-
quence νn(k) of νn that weakly converges to some ν ∈ ∆(R). Since the second order mo-
ment are bounded, we may select a subsequence of νn(k) such that the second order moments
converge. According to Proposition 23, this implies the W2-convergence of νn(k).
Corollary 28. Any accumulation point ν of the sequence (νn) satisfies Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞ where
λ∞ = N (0, 1).
Proof. Take a subsequence νn(k) converging to ν in W2. Since we also have λn(k) → λ∞ in
W2, we may apply our continuity result on T (see Proposition 24) to conclude Tλ∞(ν) =
λ∞.
Proposition 29. Suppose that ν is a probability measure such that Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞ with
λ∞ = N (0, 1), then:
1/ The function Ψν,λ∞ (see Definition 15) is C
2.
2/ The pair (ψ, c) := (Ψν,λ∞ ,
1
αν,λ∞
) is a solution of the following differential system D :
(D)


(1) ∀s ∈ R, fµ(ψ′(s))ψ′′(s)H ′(sψ′(s)− ψ(s)) = cN (s)
(2) lims→−∞ψ′(s) = 0
(3) lims→+∞ψ′(s) = 1
(4)
∫ +∞
−∞ ψ(z)N (z)dz = 0
where N (z) := e
− z22√
2π
.
This proposition is proved in Annex 11.3.
Theorem 30. There exists at most one pair (ψ, c) solution to the system D .
This Theorem is proved in Annex 11.4.
Corollary 31. There exists a unique measure ν such that Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞ where λ∞ =
N (0, 1)
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Proof. If ν1 and ν2 are two solutions of Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞, then the pairs (Ψνi,λ∞ ,
1
ανi,λ∞
) for
i = 1, 2 would be solutions of the system D according to Proposition 29. As a result
of Theorem 30: Ψν1,λ∞ = Ψν2,λ∞ . Thus the derivatives of these functions also coincide:
γν1 = γν2 where γνi are defined in Definition 14. Since Fµ is one-to-one, this implies that
Fν1 = Fν2 and thus ν1 = ν2.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Corollary 32. The sequence (νn) converges to the unique solution ν of Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞.
Proof. Otherwise there would exists a subsequence (νn(k)) that would not admit ν has
accumulation point. This is impossible since this sequence would have an accumulation
point ν˜ according to Lemma 27 which should satisfy: Tλ∞(ν˜) = λ∞. According to Lemma
31, we would then have a contradiction: ν˜ = ν.
9 Convergence of the price process to a CMMV
Our analysis in this section applies to any sequence (Πn,Xn) of reduced equilibria in Gn(µ).
We will focus on the price process (pnq )q=1,...,n posted by player 2 in these equilibria. In a
reduced equilibrium, the strategy (pnq )q=1,...,n of player 2 is pure (non random) but his moves
depend on the past actions ω = (u1, . . . , un) of player 1 which are random. The process
(pnq )q=1,...,n is then a stochastic process. Its law when ω is Πn|ω-distributed is called the
historical law. On the other hand, the law of the price process when ω is λn-distributed is
called the martingale equivalent law.
We have seen in Theorem 15 that when ω ∼ λn, the process (pnq )q=1,...,n is a martingale.
Furthermore λn is the unique probability equivalent to Πn|ω that has this property as stated
in Theorem 16.
Our purpose on this section is to analyze the asymptotics of the distribution of the
prices process. In subsection 9.1, we analyze the limit of the martingale equivalent laws. In
subsection 9.2, we analyze the asymptotics of the historical laws.
9.1 Convergence of the martingale equivalent law.
Let (Πn,Xn) be a sequence of reduced equilibria in Gn(µ). We already know that Xn =
Ψνn,λn(Sn) and that Πn = Πνn for a measure νn satisfying Tλn(νn) = λn. According to
formula (13), the price posted a period q is:
pnq =
√
nEλn [unΨνn,λn(Sn) | u1, . . . , uq−1] (22)
It is convenient to introduce the process Zn : t ∈]0, 1] → Znt := pn⌊nt⌋ where ⌊x⌋ is the
largest integer less or equal to x. This is a continuous time process that jumps to the next
value of pnq at time t =
q
n
. We analyze in this section the asymptotics of the law Qn of Z
n
when (u1, . . . , un) are endowed with the probability λn.
Let us introduce the notation Snq =
∑q
i=1 ui√
n
. Formula (22) can be written as:
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pnq =
√
nEλn [unΨνn,λn(S
n
n−1 +
un√
n
) | u1, . . . , uq−1]
=
√
n
2
Eλn [Ψνn,λn(S
n
n−1 +
1√
n
)−Ψνn,λn(Snn−1 −
1√
n
) | u1, . . . , uq−1] (23)
=
√
n
2
Eλn [Ψνn,λn(S
n
n−1 +
1√
n
)−Ψνn,λn(Snn−1 −
1√
n
) | Snq−1]
Heuristically we have that pnq ≈ Eλn [Ψ′νn,λn(S
n
n−1) | Snq−1]. From Corollary 32, we have
that νn converges to ν. Furthermore, according to Donkster theorem, S
n
⌊tn⌋ converges in
law to Bt where B is a standard Brownian motion. We can heuristically expect therefore
that Znt converges in law to Zt := E[Ψ
′
ν,λ∞
(B1)|Bt]. This will be our focus in this section.
Observe next that Z must be a CMMV. Indeed Ψ′ is an increasing function and we may
apply the following lemma.
Lemma 33. If B is a Brownian motion on a filtration (Ft) and if g is an increasing
function R→ R, then Xt := E[g(B1)|Ft] is a CMMV.
Proof. Due to the Markov property of the Brownian motion, we have Xt = E[g(B1)|Ft] =
E[g(B1)|Bt] = E[g(Bt + (B1 − Bt))|Bt]. We get therefore Xt = f(Bt, t), where f(x, t) =
Ez[g(x + z
√
1− t)], with z ∼ N (0, 1). Note that f is the convolution of g with a normal
density kernel. This convolution preserves the class of increasing functions and f is thus
indeed increasing in x. It is further C2 due to the smoothing property of the normal
kernel.
Let us now prove formally the convergence of Znt to Zt. We start by reminding the def-
inition of the weak convergence in finite distributions of a sequence of stochastic processes:
Definition 34. A sequence (Zn) of processes converges in finite dimensional distribution
to a process Z if and only if for all finite family J of times (t1 < · · · < tk), the random
vectors (Znt )t∈J converge in law to the random vector (Zt)t∈J .
Our main theorem is then:
Theorem 35. Under the equivalent martingale measure, (Zn) converges in finite dimen-
sional distribution to the CMMV Z where Zt := E[Ψ
′
ν,λ∞
(B1)|Bt]
Proof. We will prove this convergence by proving that the W2(ρn, ρ) → 0 when ρn and ρ
are respectively the laws of the vectors (Znt )t∈J and (Zt)t∈J . We use ”Skorokhod repre-
sentation” techniques to get that result. Let (Ω˜,A , P˜ ) be a probability space on which B
is a Brownian motion. In this section, unless otherwise stated, all expectations on Ω˜ are
taken with respect to P˜ . Zt = E[Ψ
′
ν,λ∞
(B1)|Bt] can be considered as a process on that space.
We will introduce hereafter a sequence of processes Z˜n defined on Ω˜ such that:
1/ Z˜n and Zn have the same laws.
2/ sup
t
‖Z˜nt − Zt‖L2 → 0. (24)
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Theorem will then be proved. Indeed, (Z˜n, Z) is a pair of processes on the same prob-
ability space (Ω˜,A , P˜ ). The joint joint law of (Z˜nt , Zt)t∈J is a probability distribution on
R
2|J | with respective marginals ρn and ρ. Therefore:
W2(ρn, ρ) ≤
√√√√E
[∑
t∈J
|Z˜nt − Zt|2
]
=
√√√√[∑
t∈J
‖Z˜nt − Zt‖2L2
]
≤
√
|J | sup
t∈]0,1]
‖Z˜nt − Zt‖L2 → 0
In order to construct those random variables Z˜n, it is convenient to apply the embedding
techniques already used in De Meyer [2010]. Let Ft denote the natural filtration of the
Brownian motion B. Define τn0 = 0 and, recursively, τ
n
q+1 as the first time t > τ
n
q such
that |Bt − Bτnq | = 1√n . Since the one-dimensional Brownian motion is a recurrent process
τnq < ∞ almost surely and clearly u˜q :=
√
n(Bτnq − Bτnq−1) has the same distribution as uq
under λn. Indeed u˜q ∈ {−1,+1} and E[u˜q] = 0. They are furthermore independent since
the increments Bτnq −Bτnq−1 are independent of Fτnq−1 .
Therefore, Bτnq =
∑q
j=1(Bτnj − Bτnj−1) = 1√n
∑q
j=1 u˜j has the same distribution as S
n
q
under λn. We set:
z˜nn :=
√
n
2
(
Ψn(Bτnn−1 +
1√
n
)−Ψn(Bτnn−1 −
1√
n
)
)
(25)
z˜n has then the same distribution as p
n
n. Furthermore, if we define:
z˜nq := E[z˜n|u˜1, . . . , u˜q−1] = E[z˜n|Fτnq−1 ]
the process (z˜nq )q=1,...,n has the same distribution as the process (p
n
q )q=1,...,n under λn, as it
follows from equations (23) and (25). We next define:
Z˜nt := z˜
n
⌊nt⌋
It is then clear that Z˜n and Zn have the same laws which claim 1 in (24). We next
prove claim 2:
‖Z˜nt − Zt‖L2 =‖E[z˜nn |Fτn⌊nt⌋−1 ]− Zt‖L2
≤‖E[z˜nn |Fτn⌊nt⌋−1 ]− Zτn⌊nt⌋−1‖L2 + ‖Zτn⌊nt⌋−1 − Zt‖L2
=‖E[z˜nn − Z1|Fτn⌊nt⌋−1 ]‖L2 + ‖Zτn⌊nt⌋−1 − Zt‖L2
≤‖z˜nn − Z1]‖L2 + ‖Zτn⌊nt⌋−1 − Zt‖L2
We next argue that both terms of the right hand side go to zero as n goes to ∞.
Let us start with the second one. First observe that all the martingales on the Brownian
filtration are continuous (see Revuz and Yor [1999], theorem V.3.5), and Zt = E[Z1|Ft] in
particular. If ‖Zτn⌊nt⌋−1−Zt‖L2 was not converging to zero, there would exists a subsequence
n(k) such that (Z
τ
n(k)
⌊n(k)t⌋−1
) does not admit Zt as accumulation point in L
2. We prove in
Lemma 36 that τn⌊nt⌋−1 → t in L2. The sequence n(k) can thus be selected such that
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τ
n(k)
⌊n(k)t⌋−1 → t almost surely. By continuity we get then that (Zτn(k)⌊n(k)t⌋−1) converges almost
surely to Z1 and the convergence also holds in L
2 since (Zt) is uniformly integrable (Z1 =
Ψ′
ν,λ∞
(B1) = F
1
µ(Fν(B1)) is bounded). This contradicts the definition of the subsequence
n(k).
Assume now that the first term does not converge to zero. There would exist a subse-
quence n(k) such that z˜
n(k)
n(k) does not have Z1 as accumulation point in L
2.
Setting an(k) := Bτn(k)
n(k)−1
− 1√
n(k)
and bn(k) := Bτn(k)
n(k)−1
+ 1√
n(k)
, equation (25) becomes
z˜
n(k)
n(k) =
Ψn(k)(bn(k))−Ψn(k)(an(k))
bn(k)−an(k) . With the mean value theorem, we conclude that there exists
xn(k) ∈ [an(k), bn(k)] such that z˜n(k)n(k) ∈ ∂Ψn(k)(xn(k)).
But it follows from Lemma 36 here below that B
τ
n(k)
n(k)−1
converges in L2 to B1. The
subsequence n(k) can thus be selected in such a way that B
τ
n(k)
n(k)−1
converges to B1 almost
surely and so does xn(k). Since Ψn = Ψνn,λn converges uniformly to Ψν,λ∞ which is C
2,
we may apply the forecoming Lemma 37 to conclude that z˜nn converges almost surely to
Ψ′n(B1) = Z1. Since z˜nn belongs to ∂Ψn(k)(xn(k)) ⊂ [0, 1], it follows from the Lebesgue
dominated convergence theorem that z˜
n(k)
n(k) converges to Z1 in L
2, in contradiction with the
definition of the subsequence n(k). Hence, as announced both terms go to zero. Therefore
both claims in (24) are satisfied by the process Z˜n and Theorem 35 is thus proved.
We next prove the announced lemma.
Lemma 36.
Claim 1: τn⌊nt⌋ −→
L2
t
Claim 2: Bτnn−1 −→
L2
B1
Proof. As well known:
E(τnq ) = E(B
2
τnq
) = Eλn((S
n
q )
2) =
q
n
On the other hand, τnq+1− τnq is independent of Fτnq . Therefore, τnq =
∑q−1
i=0 τ
n
i+1− τni is
a sum of independent random variables with expectation 1
n
.
Moreover we have V ar(τn⌊nt⌋)→ 0 when n→∞.
Indeed:
V ar(τnq+1 − τnq ) ≤ E((τnq+1 − τnq )2) ≤ CE[|Bτnq+1 −Bτnq |4] = C(
1√
n
)4 =
C
n2
where C is the Burkholder’s constant for p = 4 (see Theorem IV.4.1 in Revuz and Yor
[1999]).
Therefore:
V ar(τnq ) =
q−1∑
i=0
V ar(τni+1 − τni ) ≤
qC
n2
≤ C
n
And:
‖τnq −
q
n
‖2L2 = ‖τnq − E[τnq ]‖2L2 = V ar(τnq ) ≤
C
n
(26)
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Replacing q by ⌊nt⌋, we get claim 1 as announced.
It is also well known that E[(Bτnn−1 −B1)2] = E[|τnn−1− 1|]. With equation (26) we get:
‖Bτnn−1 −B1‖2L2 = ‖τnn−1− 1‖L1 ≤ ‖τnn−1− n−1n ‖L2 + 1n ≤ C+1n → 0. Claim 2 is thus also
proved.
Lemma 37. Let (Ψn) be a sequence of convex functions that converges uniformly to a C
1
function Ψ. Let (xn) and (zn) be two real sequences such that:
(1) xn converges to x.
(2) for all n: zn ∈ ∂Ψn(xn).
Then zn converges to Ψ
′(x).
Proof. Since zn ∈ ∂Ψn(xn), we get with u ∈ {−1,+1} that:
Ψ(xn + u) + ‖Ψ −Ψn‖∞ ≥ Ψn(xn + u) ≥ Ψn(xn) + uzn ≥ Ψ(xn)− ‖Ψn −Ψ‖∞ + uzn
Therefore uzn ≤ Ψ(xn + u)−Ψ(xn) + 2‖Ψn −Ψ‖∞ and thus:
|zn| ≤ max
u∈{−1,+1}
Ψ(xn + u)−Ψ(xn) + 2‖Ψn −Ψ‖∞
Since the right hand side is bounded, any subsequence of (zn) has an accumulation point.
All these accumulation points must be in ∂Ψ(x). Indeed, if a subsequence (zn(k)) converges
to z, we have for all y: Ψn(k)(y) ≥ Ψn(k)(xn(k)) + zn(k)(y − xn(k)). Letting k go to infinity,
we get then for all y: Ψ(y) ≥ Ψ(x) + z(y − x) and therefore z ∈ ∂Ψ(x) = {Ψ′(x)} since Ψ
is C1. All subsequence of (zn) has Ψ
′(x) as accumulation point, this is equivalent to the
claim that zn converges to Ψ
′(x).
9.2 Convergence of the historical law
Let (Πn,Xn) be a sequence of reduced equilibria in Gn(µ). We already know that Xn =
Ψνn,λn(S
n
n) and that the marginal Πn of Πn on (L,S
n
n) coincides with Πνn for a measure
νn satisfying Tλn(νn) = λn. We further know that νn converges to the unique solution ν of
Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞. Therefore, Πn converges to Πν in W2 distance. Our aim in this section is
somehow to analyze the asymptotics of the law Πn of (u1, . . . , un, L), or more specifically,
the law of the price process pnq (u1, . . . , uq−1) when (u1, . . . , un, L) ∼ Πn. This law is called
the historical law. Note that we can’t speak of the convergence of Πn itself because the
space on which probability Πn is defined depends on n. We will use the embedding technics
introduced in the previous subsection.
Let yn(ωn) denote the density of
∂Πn|ωn
∂λn
, so yn is a function of ωn = (u1, . . . , un). In
the previous subsection, we created sequences S˜nq = Bτnq and u˜ of random variables on
(Ω˜,A , P˜ ) a probability space on which B is a Brownian motion in such a way that S˜nq and
u˜ have the same distribution as Sn and u under λn.
Setting y˜n := yn(u˜1, . . . , u˜n), we infer that y˜n is a probability density on (Ω˜,A , P˜ ), and
under the probability P˜n := y˜n.P˜ , the process (u˜1, . . . , u˜n) is Πn|ωn-distributed.
We first prove the following lemma:
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Lemma 38. y˜n converges in L
1(P˜ ) to y˜ := β
Y˜
where Y˜ := H ′(Ψ′ν(B1)B1 − Ψν(B1)) and
β = 1
E
P˜
[ 1
Y˜
]
Proof. Our first task will be to define a variable L˜n on the space (Ω˜,A , P˜ ) such that the
process (u˜1, . . . , u˜n, L˜n) is Πn-distributed under P˜n.
This can be done as follows: ω˜n := (u˜1, . . . , u˜n) is Fτnn measurable. Let Vn := Bτnn+1 −
Bτnn . Under P˜ , Vn ∼ N (0, 1) and is independent of Fτnn . Since y˜n = yn(ω˜n), Vn will
have the same law N (0, 1) and will still be independent of Fτnn under P˜n. Let Fωn de-
note the cumulative distribution function of the conditional law of L conditionally to ωn
under Πn. We then set L˜n := F
−1
ω˜n
(FN (0,1)(Vn)). L˜n has the same conditional law given ω˜n
as L given ωn under Πn. Therefore (ω˜n, L˜n) under P˜n has the same law as (ωn, L) under Πn.
We now prove that, under P˜ , L˜n converges to Ψ
′
ν(B1) almost surely. Indeed, since
Ln belongs Πn-almost surely to ∂Ψn(S
n
n), we infer that L˜n belongs P˜n-almost surely to
∂Ψn(S˜
n
n). Since P˜n is equivalent to P˜ , we conclude that L˜n ∈ ∂Ψn(S˜nn) P˜ -almost surely.
Since Ψn converges uniformly to Ψν ∈ C2 and since S˜nn converges almost surely to B1,
we apply Lemma 37 to conclude that L˜n converges P˜ -almost surely to Ψ
′
ν(B1). Therefore:
(L˜n, S˜
n
n)
P˜−a.s.→ (Ψ′ν(B1), B1) (27)
We define Yn := EΠn [H
′(LSnn − Ψn(Snn))|ωn]. Yn is then a function Yn(ωn). It follows
from Corollary 14 that ∂λn
∂Πn|ωn
= Yn
EΠn [Yn]
.
We set Y˜n := Yn(ω˜n). We clearly have P˜n-almost surely, and thus also P˜ -almost surely,
that Y˜n = EP˜n [H
′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))|ω˜n].
Since y˜n =
∂P˜n
∂P˜
is just a function of ω˜n , it follows that:
EP˜n [H
′(L˜nS˜nn−Ψn(S˜nn))|ω˜n] =
EP˜ [y˜nH
′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))|ω˜n]
EP˜ [y˜n|ω˜n]
= EP˜ [H
′(L˜nS˜nn−Ψn(S˜nn))|ω˜n]
Note next that S˜nn is ω˜n-measurable and L˜n is a function of the pair (ω˜n, Vn). Since Vn
is independent of Fτnn we get then:
Y˜n = EP˜ [H
′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))|ω˜n] = EP˜ [H ′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))|Fτnn ]
We claim that Y˜n converge in L
1 to Y˜ := H ′(Ψ′ν(B1)B1 −Ψν(B1)). Indeed:
‖Y˜n − Y˜ ‖L1 =‖EP˜ [H ′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))|Fτnn ]− Y˜ ‖L1
≤‖EP˜ [H ′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))− Y˜ |Fτnn ]‖L1 + ‖EP˜ [Y˜ |Fτnn ]− Y˜ ‖L1
We next claim that H ′(L˜nS˜nn − Ψn(S˜nn)) converges P˜ -almost surely to Y˜ . Indeed, ac-
cording to equation (27), (L˜n, S˜
n
n) converges almost surely to (Ψ
′
ν(B1), B1). Furthermore
Ψn converges uniformly to Ψν . Therefore Ψn(S˜
n
n) converges P˜n- almost surely to Ψν(B1).
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Since H ′ is continuous, we conclude that H ′(L˜nS˜nn − Ψn(S˜nn)) converges P˜n-almost surely
to Y˜ . Since H ′ is further bounded, this later convergence holds also in L1 and thus:
‖EP˜ [H ′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))− Y˜ |Fτnn ]‖L1 ≤ ‖H ′(L˜nS˜nn −Ψn(S˜nn))− Y˜ ‖L1 → 0
We next claim that EP˜ [Y˜ |Fτnn ] converges to Y˜ in L1. On the contrary one would have
a subsequence n(k) such that EP˜ [Y˜ |Fτn(k)
n(k)
] does not admit Y˜ as accumulation point in L1.
Since Ft is the natural filtration of a Brownian motion, it results from theorem V.3.5
in Revuz and Yor [1999] that the martingale rt := E[Y˜ |Ft] is continuous and uniformly
integrable. Therefore, due to the optional stopping theorem, we have EP˜ [Y˜ |Fτn(k)
n(k)
] = r
τ
n(k)
n(k)
.
Since τnn converges in L
2 to 1, there is no loss of generality to assume, possibly after
selection of a smaller subsequence, that n(k) further satisfies that τ
n(k)
n(k) converges P˜ -almost
surely to 1. But then r
τ
n(k)
n(k)
converges almost surely to r1 = EP˜ [Y˜ |F1] = Y˜ . But due to
the uniform integrability of the martingale rt, this convergence also holds in L
1, in contra-
diction with the definition of the subsequence n(k). Therefore, as announced, EP˜ [Y˜ |Fτnn ]
converges to Y˜ in L1.
According to Corollary 14, ∂λn
∂Πn|ω
= αn.Yn, and thus
∂Πn|ωn
∂λn
= βn
Yn
for a constant βn.
Therefore for all ωn, yn(ωn) =
βn
Yn(ωn)
and y˜n =
βn
Y˜n
. Since Y˜n is a probability density under
P˜ we get βn =
1
E
P˜
[ 1
Y˜n
]
.
Since 0 < ǫ < Y˜ < K (assumptions A2 on H), 1
Y˜n
converges in L1 to 1
Y˜
and it results
as announced that y˜n converges in L
1 to y˜ = β
Y˜
where β = 1
E
P˜
[ 1
Y˜
]
.
Theorem 16 claims that the martingale equivalent distribution Qn converges to a limit
distribution Q. The next theorem is the counterpart of this result for the historical distri-
bution. It claims that Pn converges to a limit distribution P which is the law of the process
Z when Ω˜ is endowed with the probability measure y˜P˜ . Therefore the limit distributions
P and Q are equivalent.
This result is the main result of this paper. It claims that the asymptotics of the
historical price process is a CMMV under an appropriate martingale equivalent measure Q.
Theorem 39. The price process Znt under the probability Πn converges in finite dimensional
distribution to the process Z when Ω˜ is endowed with the probability y˜.P˜ where y˜ = 1
E
P˜
[ 1
Y˜
]Y˜
>
0.
Proof. Let J a finite family of times. Let φ be a continuous and bounded function: R|J | → R.
It is convenient to introduce the notations Z˜nJ := (Z˜
n
t )t∈J and Z
n
J := (Z
n
t )t∈J . Then
observe that EΠn [φ(Z
n
J )] = EP˜n [φ(Z˜
n
J )] = EP˜ [y˜nφ(Z˜
n
J )]. We next claim that EP˜ [y˜nφ(Z˜
n
J )]
converges to EP˜ [y˜φ(ZJ)]. Indeed, on the contrary there would exist a subsequence n(k)
that EP˜ [y˜n(k)φ(Z˜
n(k)
J )] does not admit EP˜ [y˜φ(ZJ )] as accumulation point. However, as it
results from equation (24) and Lemma 38, we have that Z˜
n(k)
t → Zt in L2 for all t and that
y˜n(k) → y˜ in L1. Possibly after selection of a smaller subsequence, we may assume without
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loss of generality that the sequence n(k) is further such that Z˜
n(k)
J → ZJ and that y˜n(k) → y˜
almost surely. Due to the continuity of φ, we get that y˜n(k)φ(Z˜
n(k)
J ) converges almost surely
to y˜φ(ZJ). Since both φ and y˜n are bounded, we have with Lebesgue dominated convergence
theorem that EP˜ [y˜n(k)φ(
˜
Z
n(k)
J )] converges to EP˜ [y˜φ(ZJ )], which is in contradiction with the
definition of n(k). Therefore, as announced, EΠn [φ(Z
n
J )]→ EP˜ [y˜φ(ZJ )] for all J : the law of
ZnJ converges weakly in ∆(R
|J |) to the law of ZJ under y˜.P˜ and the theorem is proved.
10 Conclusion
To conclude this paper we would like to make some remarks on the obtained results.
The first one is about the dual game. Our first attempt to analyze this game was using
duality techniques. The dual game G⋆n(φ) is in fact the reduced game where Player 1 is
allowed to select privately the value of L but his payoff is decreased by a penalty φ(L).
The function φ is known by both players. Strategies and payoffs are the same for Player
2. A strategy Π for Player 1 is a joint probability on (ω,L) but there is no constraint on
the marginal Π|L. It can be easily proved that if (Π⋆, p) is an equilibrium in G⋆n(φ) and if
µ = Π⋆|L then (Π
⋆, p) is an equilibrium in Gn(µ). It can then be proved that there exists a
function φn and an equilibrium (Π
⋆
n, pn) in G
⋆
n(φn) such that Π
⋆
|L = µ. Therefore (Π
⋆
n, pn)
is a sequence of equilibria in Gn(µ). One of the reason for introducing the dual game was
that the asymptotics of the reduced equilibria in G⋆n(φ) was quiet easy to analyze (with φ
independent of n). However, to analyze the asymptotics of the equilibria in Gn(µ) using the
dual game, we would have to analyze a sequence of equilibria in G⋆n(φn) for an appropriate
sequence of φn. This makes the analysis more involved and explains why we decided to
limit our paper to the game Gn(µ).
The second remark is about the generality of our results. The results obtained in
[De Meyer, 2010] were somehow more general than those obtained in the present paper: in
the risk-neutral case, if the mechanism belongs to the class of natural mechanisms, then
the price process at equilibrium converge to a CMMV for all sequences of equilibria in
Gn(µ). The current paper is only concerned with one particular natural mechanism for
which the price process is explicit. For this mechanism we do not analyze the asymptotic
of any sequence of equilibria, but only of sequences of reduced equilibria: we prove that
the price processes at a reduced equilibrium converges to a CMMV under the risk-neutral
probability. This naturally raises two questions: do we have the same asymptotic for any
sequence of equilibria in our game? And will this dynamic appear for more general price
based mechanism? We conjecture a positive answer to both questions but are presently
unable to prove it.
Finally, we just want to mention an alternative approach to our results. It would
indeed be possible to introduce continuous time games quite similar to the Brownian games
introduced in De Meyer [1999] : a strategy Πn in the reduced game can be viewed as a pair
(yn, ρn) where ρn is a conditional law of L given ω and yn is the density
∂Πn|ω
∂λn
. Player 1’s
payoff is given by Eλn [yn(LSn−
∑n
q=1 pq(Sq−Sq−1)]. Heuristically, under λn, Sn converges
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to B1 and the payoff function of Player 1 should converge to E[y(LB1−
∫ 1
0 ptdBt)]. Similarly
player 2 payoff would be E[yH(LB1 −
∫ 1
0 ptdBt)].
11 Annexes
11.1 Annexes for section 6
Lemma 40. Let (Π⋆n,Ψ
⋆
n) be an equilibrium and p the corresponding pure strategy of player
2. Then we have:
pnq (u1, . . . , uq−2, 1) > p
n
q (u1, . . . , uq−2,−1)
Proof. Since Ψn is convex, its derivative exists except on a countable number of points. We
may therefore write:
χ(x) :=
√
n
2
(
Ψn(x+
1√
n
)−Ψn(x− 1√
n
)
)
=
√
n
2
∫ 1√
n
−1√
n
Ψ′n(x+ v)dv (28)
Denote U = {−n+1+2k√
n
|k ∈ 0, . . . , n − 1} the set of possible values of Snn−1, where
Snq :=
1√
n
∑q
k=1 uq.
We first prove that χ is strictly increasing on U . Let x, y be two successive points in U
(i.e. y = x+ 2√
n
) and assume that χ(x) = χ(y). We have then:
0 = χ(y)− χ(x) =
√
n
2
∫ 1√
n
−1√
n
Ψ′n(y + v)−Ψ′n(x+ v)dv
Since Ψ′ is increasing, this is the integral of a positive function which is 0. This is only
possible if Ψ′n(y + v) − Ψ′n(x + v) = 0 for almost every v, which means in particular that
Ψ′n(z) = Ψ′n(z +
2√
n
) for every z ∈]x − 1√
n
, x + 1√
n
[. Ψ′n is therefore constant on the
interval ]x − 1√
n
, y + 1√
n
[. This implies that Ψ is differentiable at the point z = x + 1√
n
which is a possible value for Sn = S
n
n−1 +
un√
n
. The event {Sn = z} has a strictly positive
probability under λn and we infer also that Πn(Sn = z) > 0 since λn and Πn|ω are equivalent
probabilities as it follows from condition (C4) and the fact that H ′ is strictly positive.
Since ∂Ψn(z) = {Ψ′n(z)}, we infer from (C3) that Πn(L = Ψ′(z)) > 0. According to
(C2), L is µ-distributed under Πn and we would therefore have µ({Ψ′n(z)}) > 0, which
contradict our hypothesis A1 that µ has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure. This
concludes the proof that χ is increasing on U .
According to formula (13), we get:
pnq (u1, . . . , uq−1) =Eλn
[√
n
2
(
Ψn(S
n
n−1 +
1√
n
)−Ψn(Snn−1 −
1√
n
)
)
| u1, . . . , uq−1
]
=Eλn [χ(S
n
n−1)|u1, . . . , uq−1]
=Eλn [χ(S
n
n−1)|Snq−1]
=Eλn [χ(S
n
q−1 + V )|Snq−1]
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where V =
uq+···+un−1√
n
. Since V is independent of Sq−1, we get therefore pnq (u1, . . . , uq−1) =
r(Sq−1) where r(x) := Eλn [χ(x+ V )] is a strictly increasing function on the set of possible
values of Snq−1.
11.2 The continuity of Tλ
The aim of this subsection is to prove Proposition 24, which is usefull to prove the existence
of an equilibrium in section 7.
We will prove the continuity of the operator step by step. The following lemma are
useful in the proof of the continuity.
Lemma 41. The mappings ν → Φν and ν → Γν are continuous from (P2(R),W2) to the set
of convex functions on respectively ]0, 1[ and R with the topology of uniform convergence.
Proof. Let ν1, ν2 be two measures in P2(R) and x ∈]0, 1[.
|Φν1(x)− Φν2(x)| ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ x
0
F−1ν1 (Fµ(ℓ))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(ℓ))dℓ
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫ x
0
∣∣F−1ν1 (Fµ(ℓ))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(ℓ))∣∣ dℓ
≤
∫ 1
0
∣∣F−1ν1 (Fµ(ℓ))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(ℓ))∣∣ fµ(ℓ)fµ(ℓ)dℓ
≤ Eµ[
∣∣F−1ν1 (Fµ(L))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(L))∣∣
fµ(L)
]
≤
√
Eµ[(F
−1
ν1 (Fµ(L))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(L)))2]
√
Eµ[
1
fµ(L)2
]
The last inequality follows from Cauchy Scwharz theorem. The right hand side does not
depend on x ∈]0, 1[, therefore:
‖Φν1 − Φν2‖∞ ≤
√
Eµ[(F
−1
ν1 (Fµ(L))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(L)))2]
√
Eµ[
1
fµ(L)2
] (29)
It results for work of [Dall’Aglio, 1956] and [Fre´chet, 1957] that W2(ν1, ν2) may be
explicitly computed in the case of one dimensional probability distributions: minimizing∫
R
| x − y |2 dπ(x, y) is equivalent to maximizing Eπ(xy), which amounts to maximizing
cov(XY ) with X ∼ ν1 and Y ∼ ν2. This maximum is reached when X and Y can be
written as increasing functions (here F−1ν1 and F
−1
ν2
) of the same uniform random variable
U . Indeed U = Fµ(L) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] when L ∼ µ. Therefore we have
that:
W2(ν1, ν2) =
√
Eµ[(F
−1
ν1 (Fµ(L))− F−1ν2 (Fµ(L)))2] (30)
Since fµ is bounded from below by ǫ > 0 ( assumption A1) we conclude:
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‖Φν1 − Φν2‖∞ ≤W2(ν1, ν2)
√
Eµ[
1
fµ(L)2
] ≤W2(ν1, ν2)
√
1
ǫ2
Then we proved that the mapping ν → Φν is
√
1
ǫ2
-Lipschitz continuous for the uniform
norm.
We now prove that ν → Γν is also Lipschitz continuous.
Observe that Γν(s) = Φ
♯
ν(s) − Φ♯ν(0). Indeed from the definition of Γν and Φν we get
that the ∂Φν(ℓ) = [φν(ℓ
−), φν(ℓ)] and thus by Fenchel lemma :
∂Φ♯ν(s) = [φ
−1
ν (s
−), φ−1ν (s)] = [γν(s
−), γν(s)] = ∂Γν(s)
The two functions Φ♯ν and Γν just differ by a constant, and since Γν(0) = 0 we find
Γν(x) = Φ
♯
ν(x) − Φ♯ν(0). As well known Fenchel transform in an isometry for the uniform
norm7. We conclude that the mapping ν → Γν is also Lipschitz continuous for the uniform
norm.
Lemma 42. If W2(νk, ν)→ 0 then W2(Πνk ,Πν)→ 0.
Proof. Let L be a random variable with law µ. Let X1 = (L, φνk(L)) and X2 = (L, φν(L)).
Then X1 ∼ Πνk and X2 ∼ Πν .
W2(Πνk ,Πν)
2 ≤ ‖X1 −X2‖2L2 = ‖L− L‖2L2 + ‖φνk(L)− φν(L)‖2L2 =W2(νk, ν)2
where the last equality follows from equation (30).
Lemma 43. If W2(λk, λ)→ 0 and W2(νk, ν)→ 0 then:
1/ ‖Ψνk,λk −Ψν,λ‖∞ → 0
2/ For all continuous function Θ such that Θ(x)
1+x2
is bounded, we have:
EΠνn [Θ(Sn)H
′(SnL−Ψνk,λk(Sn))]→ EΠν [Θ(Sn)H ′(SnL−Ψν,λ(Sn))]
Proof.
1/ ‖Ψνk,λk −Ψν,λ‖∞ =‖(Γνk − Eλk [Γνk ])− (Γν − Eλ[Γν ])‖∞
≤‖Γνk − Γν‖∞ + ‖Eλk [Γνk ]− Eλk [Γν ]‖∞ + |Eλk [Γν ]− Eλ[Γν ]|
≤2‖Γνk − Γν‖∞ + |Eλk [Γν ]− Eλ[Γν ]|
The first term of the right hand side goes to zero according to Lemma 41. Next observe
that ∂Γν = [γ(s
−), γ(s)] ⊂ [0, 1]. Indeed, γν(s) = F−1µ (Fν(s)) belongs to [0, 1] since the
support of µ is [0, 1]. Furthermore, by definition Γν is a continuous function that satisfies
Γν(0) = 0. Therefore, |Γν(x)| ≤ |x| ≤ C(1 + x2) for a constant C. Since W2(νk, ν) goes
7Let indeed f and g be two lower semi continuous convex functions Rn → R, then || f ♯−g♯ ||∞=|| f−g ||∞.
Indeed, for all x ∈ R: f ♯(x) = supt x.t− f(t) ≤ supt x.t− g(t)+‖f− g‖∞ = g
♯(x)+‖f− g‖∞. Interchanging
f and g we get therefore for all x: |f ♯(x)− g♯(x)| ≤ ‖f − g‖∞. Since the right hand side doesn’t depend on
x, we get: ‖f ♯− g♯‖∞ ≤ ‖f − g‖∞. The reverse inequality follows from Fenchel lemma: f ♯♯ = f and g♯♯ = g.
Therefore: ‖f − g‖∞ = ‖f ♯♯ − g♯♯‖∞ ≤ ‖f ♯ − g♯‖∞ as announced.
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to zero, we conclude with Proposition 23 that νk converges weakly in P2(R) and therefore
Eλk [Γν ]→ Eλ[Γν ]
Γ is further continuous as claimed in Proposition 23, the last term goes also to zero.
2/ |EΠνk [Θ(Sn)H
′(SnL−Ψνk,λk(Sn))] − EΠν [Θ(Sn)H ′(SnL−Ψν,λ(Sn))]| ≤ Ik + Jk
where
Ik := |EΠνk [Θ(Sn)H ′(SnL−Ψνk,λk(Sn))]− EΠνk [Θ(S)H ′(SnL−Ψν,λ(Sn))]|
and
Jk := |EΠνk [Θ(Sn)H ′(SnL−Ψν,λ(Sn))]− EΠν [Θ(Sn)H ′(SnL−Ψν,λ(Sn))]|.
According to A1, H ′ is Lipschitz continuous. Let Kˆ denote the Lipschitz constant, then:
Ik ≤ EΠνk [|Θ(Sn)|Kˆ‖Ψνk,λk −Ψν,λ‖∞] = Kˆ‖Ψνk,λk −Ψν,λ‖∞Eνk [|Θ(Sn)|]
Since |Θ(Sn)| ≤ C(1+S2n) andW2(νk, ν)→ 0 we get with Proposition 23 that Eνk [|Θ(Sn)|]→
Eν [|Θ(Sn)|] <∞. On the other hand ‖Ψνk,λk −Ψν,λ‖∞ → 0 according to the first claim of
this lemma. Ik converges therefore to 0.
The map (L,Sn) → Θ(Sn)H ′(SnL − Ψν,λ(Sn)) is continuous and is also bounded by
C(1 + ‖(L,Sn)‖2) since H ′ is itself bounded. Since Πνk converges to Πν in W2, it follows
from Proposition 23 that Jk goes to zero.
We are now ready to prove the Proposition 24.
Proof of Proposition 24.
We have to prove that if Θ continuous and satisfies | Θ(s) |≤ C(1 + s2), then:
ETλk (νk)
[Θ]→ ETλ(ν)[Θ]
According to the definition of Tλk(νk) this amounts to show that:
Eνk [Θ(Sn).ανk,λk .Yνk,λk(Sn)]→ Eν [Θ(Sn).αν,λ.Yν,λ(Sn)] (31)
We first prove that:
Eνk [Θ(Sn).Yνk,λk(Sn)]→ Eν [Θ(Sn).Yν,λ(Sn)] (32)
Due to the definition of Yνk,λk we get:
Eνk [Θ(Sn).Yνk,λk(Sn)] =Eνk [Θ(Sn).EΠνk [H
′(LSn −Ψνk,λk(Sn))|Sn]]
=EΠνk [Θ(Sn).EΠνk [H
′(LSn −Ψνk,λk(Sn))|Sn]]
=EΠνk [Θ(Sn).H
′(LSn −Ψνk,λk(Sn))]
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and we have a similar formula for Eν [Θ(Sn).Yν,λ(Sn)]. According to claim 2 in Lemma 43:
EΠνk [Θ(Sn).H
′(LSn −Ψνk,λk(S))]→ EΠν [Θ(Sn).H ′(LSn −Ψν,λ(Sn))]
and formula (32) follows.
According to the Definition 19 we get ανk,λk =
1
Eνk [Yνk,λk ]
. With formula (32) for the
particular Θ ≡ 1, we get that Eνk [Yνk,λk ] → Eν [Yν,λ]. Since Yν,λ is bounded from below
by ǫ > 0 (assumption A2 on H), we conclude then that ανk,λk → αν,λ. Finally combining
this result with formula (32), we get the convergence announced in formula (31) and the
corollary is proved.
11.3 Proof of Proposition 29
Proof. Let ν satisfy the equation Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞. This implies that λ∞ has a strictly positive
density with respect to ν, and therefore ν has a density with respect to λ∞. In turn this
implies that it has also a density fν with respect to the Lebesgue measure. This implies in
particular that fν is continuous.
We first deal with the smoothness of Ψν,λ∞ . Remember that Ψν,λ∞ differs from Γν just
by a constant. Γν was defined as an integral of γν(s) = F
−1
µ (Fν(s)). Since Fµ is a strictly
increasing and continuous map from [0, 1] to [0, 1], its inverse is itself continuous. Since Fν
is also continuous, it follows that Γν and Ψν,λ∞ are C
1 and Ψ′
ν,λ∞
= γν .
We next prove that γν is absolutely continuous
8. This will imply on one hand (see
theorem 7.18 in Rudin [1987]) the existence of a function g integrable with respect to the
Lebesgue measure such that γν(s) =
∫ s
−∞ g(t)dt and on the other hand (by the Lebesgue
differentiation theorem) that γν is almost surely differentiable and for almost every s:
γ′ν(s) = g(s). The first claim of the proposition will then be proved by establishing that g,
which is only defined up to negligeable set, admits a continuous version.
ν is absolutely continuous:
Since ν is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, its cumulative
distribution function Fν is an absolutely continuous function
9.
We next observe that F−1µ is Lipschitz continuous. According to A1, fν is C1 on [0, 1]
and strictly positive. Let then κ > 0 be such that κ < fµ. For s˜ < s, we set b = F
−1
µ (s)
and b˜ = F−1µ (s˜) then:
|s− s˜| = s− s˜ = Fµ(b)− Fµ(b˜) =
∫ b
b˜
fµ(x)dx ≥ κ(b− b˜)
Therefore, we have:
8A function f : R → R is absolutely continuous (see definition 7.17 in Rudin [1987]) if for all ǫ > 0, and
for all sequences of disjoint real intervals [an, bn], there exists δ such that:
∑
n≥0
|bn − an| < δ ⇒
∑
n≥0
|f(an)− f(bn)| < ǫ
9If ν is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we have Fν(x)−Fν(a) =
∫ x
a
fν(t)dt.
Theorem 7.18 in Rudin [1987] implies that Fν is absolutely continuous.
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|F−1µ (s)− F−1µ (s˜)| ≤
1
κ
|s− s˜|.
The function γν = F
−1
µ (Fν(s)) introduced in Definition 15 is therefore absolutely contin-
uous. Indeed, since Fν is absolutely continuous, for ǫ > 0 and [an, bn] disjoint real intervals,
there exists δ such that:∑
n≥0
|bn − an| < δ ⇒
∑
n≥0
|(Fν(an)− Fν(bn)| < κǫ
Suppose that
∑
n≥0 |bn − an| < δ. Then:∑
n≥0
|F−1µ (Fν(an))− F−1µ (Fν(bn))| ≤
∑
n≥0
1
κ
|(Fν(an)− Fν(bn)| ≤ ǫ.
Since fµ is C
1 (see conditions A1) and positive, F−1µ is itself C1 and F−1′µ (u) =
1
fµ(F−1(u)) . Since Fν is absolutely continuous, it is almost surely differentiable and F
′
ν(s) =
fν(s), according to Lebesgue differentiation theorem. Therefore, with the composition rule,
we conclude:
g(s) = γ′ν(s) =
fν(s)
fµ(F
−1
µ (Fν(s)))
=
fν(s)
fµ(γν(s))
(33)
Since Ψν,λ∞ is C
1, and Πν satisfies (C4): Πν(L ∈ ∂Ψν,λ∞(S)) = 1, we infer that L is
almost surely equals to Ψ′
ν,λ∞
(S) under Πν and thus:
EΠν [H
′(LS −Ψν,λ∞(S))|S] = H ′(Ψ′ν,λ∞(S)S −Ψν,λ∞(S))
Our equation Tλ∞(ν) = λ∞ becomes then:
∂λ∞
∂ν
= αν,λ∞EΠν [H
′(LS −Ψν,λ∞(S))|S] = αν,λ∞ .H ′(Ψ′ν,λ∞(S)S −Ψν,λ∞(S))
Finally ∂λ∞
∂ν
is also the quotient N
fν
of the densities with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
We get therefore for almost every s:
N (s) = αν,λ∞ .H
′(Ψ′
ν,λ∞
(s)s−Ψν,λ∞(s))fν(s)
Combining this equation with equation (33), we get for almost every s:
N (s) = αν,λ∞ .H
′(Ψ′
ν,λ∞
(s)s−Ψν,λ∞(s))fµ(γν(s))g(s)
From this equation we get g(s) =
α
ν,λ∞ .H
′(Ψ′
ν,λ∞
(s)s−Ψ
ν,λ∞(s))fµ(γν(s))
N (s) almost surely.
Since the right hand side of this equality is continuous, it is the continuous version of g
we were seeking. Ψν,λ∞ is thus C
2 which is the first claim of our proposition and for every
s:
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Ψ′′
ν,λ∞
(s) =
αν,λ∞ .H
′(Ψ′
ν,λ∞
(s)s−Ψν,λ∞(s))fµ(Ψ′ν,λ∞(s))
N (s)
The pair (ψ, c) := (Ψν,λ∞ ,
1
α
ν,λ∞
) is then a solution of the first equation of the differential
problem D .
It also satisfies the following ones. Indeed, since [0, 1] is the support of µ we get:
{
lims→−∞Ψ′ν,λ∞(s) = lims→−∞F
−1
µ (Fν(s)) = 0
lims→+∞Ψ′ν,λ∞(s) = lims→+∞F
−1
ν (Fµ(s)) = 1.
Furthermore we have Ψν,λ∞ = Γν − Eλ∞ [Γν ] and thus:∫ +∞
−∞
Ψν,λ∞(z)N (z)dz = Eλ∞ [Ψν,λ∞ ] = 0
11.4 The unique solution of the differential system D.
The proof of Theorem 30 is made of several lemma that are presented below.
Let (ψ1, c1) and (ψ2, c2) be two solutions of the problem D . Without loss of generality
we may assume that c1 ≥ c2. Furthermore, we have c2 > 0. Indeed D-2 and D-3 imply
that ψ′′i must be strictly positive at some point s. At that point D-1 indicates that c2 > 0
since both fµ, H
′ and N are positive.
For all this section, we set θ := ψ1−ψ2. θ is then a C2 function. Indeed, ψi solves which
already implies that ψi has a second order derivative and is therefore C
1. Since we may
express the second order derivative from equation D-1 as a continuous function of s,ψ(s)
and ψ′(s), we have that ψ′′(s) is itself continuous and ψ(s) is C2.
According to D-4 we have
∫ +∞
−∞ θ(z)N (z)dz = 0. Since θ is a continuous function and
N (z) > 0 for all z, there exists s0 such that θ(s0) = 0.
Let us define:
Γ+ := {s > s0 | θ′(s) = 0}
and:
Γ− := {s < s0 | θ′(s) = 0}.
We also define s+ := inf Γ+ and s− := supΓ−
Observe that θ′(s) can not vanish on ]s0, s+[ nor on =]s−, s0[. θ′ has thus a constant
sign on each interval.
Lemma 44. Suppose that s0 < s
+. Then θ′ < 0 on ]s0, s+[.
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Proof.
Assume on the contrary that s0 < s
+ and θ′ > 0 on ]s0, s+[.
First case: suppose that s+ < +∞.
Since θ is increasing on ]s0, s
+[:
θ(s+) > θ(s0) = 0 (34)
and also, by definition of s+,
θ′(s+) = 0, so α := ψ′1(s
+) = ψ′2(s
+) (35)
From D-1 we get:
θ′′(s+) =
N (s+)
fµ(α)
(
c1
H ′(s+α− ψ1(s+)) −
c2
H ′(s+α− ψ2(s+)) )
≥N (s
+)c2
fµ(α)
(
1
H ′(s+α− ψ1(s+)) −
1
H ′(s+α− ψ2(s+))) > 0
since ψ1(s
+) > ψ2(s
+), as indicates equation (34) and since H ′ is strictly increasing and
c2 > 0. But this is not possible since θ
′(s+) = 0 and θ′ > 0 on ]s0, s+[ (which implies that
θ′′(s+) ≤ 0).
Second case: suppose now that s+ = +∞. It is convenient in this case to introduce the
function R on [0, 1]: R(u) = θ′(F−1
N
(u)) where FN is the cumulative function of the normal
law N (0, 1). We first prove that limu→1R′(u) > 0. Indeed:
limu→1R′(u) = lims→+∞
θ′′(s)
N (s)
= lims→+∞
c1
fµ(1)H ′(Λ1(s))
− c2
fµ(1)H ′(Λ2(s))
≥ lims→+∞ c2
fµ(1)
(
1
H ′(Λ1(s))
− 1
H ′(Λ2(s))
)
(36)
where Λi := sψ
′
i(s)− ψi(s).
Now we claim that both Λi(s) have a finite limit when s→∞ and that
lim+∞Λ1(s) < lim+∞Λ2(s). (37)
To see that Λi has a limit as s→∞, just observe that Λ′i(s) = sψ′′i (s) which is positive
for positive s since ψi is solution of D-1 and thus ψ
′′
i (s) > 0. As an increasing function, Λi
has therefore a limit as s→∞.
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Furthermore, from assumptions A1 and A2, we know that fµ and H
′ are valued in a
bounded interval [K1,K2] with K1 > 0. As a consequence,
ci
fµ(s)H′(Λi(s))
is bounded by a
constant K, and therefore:
Λi(s) = Λi(0) +
∫ s
0
Λ′i(u)du = −ψi(0) +
∫ s
0
uψ′′i (u)du ≤ −ψi(0) +K
∫ s
0
uN (u)du
where the last integral converges as s goes to +∞.
We next prove inequality (37). First observe that since ψ1 and ψ2 satisfy D-2 we get
lims→+∞θ′(s) = 0. Therefore:
|θ′(s)| = |
∫ ∞
s
θ′′(u)du| = |
∫ ∞
s
ψ′′2 (s)− ψ′′1 (s)ds| ≤ 2K
∫ ∞
s
N (u)du
and thus lims→+∞ sθ′(s) = 0. We then conclude that:
lim
s→+∞Λ1(s)− Λ2(s) = lims→+∞ sθ
′(s)− θ(s) = − lim
s→+∞ θ(s).
Next observe that lims→+∞ θ(s) > 0. Indeed: θ(s0) = 0 and ∀s ∈ [s0,+∞[, we have
θ′(s) > 0. Therefore, as announced, lims→+∞Λ1(s) < lims→+∞Λ2(s). This implies with
equation (36) that:
limu→1R′(u) > 0 (38)
Note that, according to the definition of R and the fact that θ′ > 0 on ]s0,+∞[, we get:
R(x) > 0 for x ∈]FN (s0), 1[ (39)
Finally,
limu→1R(u) = limu→1θ′(F−1N (u)) = limu→+∞θ
′(u) = 0 (40)
but relations (39) and (40) are in contradiction with (38). This conclude the proof of the
lemma.
A similar argument leads to a dual result on the left side of s0:
Lemma 45. Suppose that s− < s0. Then θ′ > 0 on ]s−, s0[.
Lemma 46. θ(s0) = θ
′(s0) = θ′′(s0) = 0.
Proof. Suppose θ′(s0) > 0. There must exist δ > 0 such that θ′(s) > 0 for s ∈]s0, s0+δ[. The
definition of s+ implies therefore s+ ≥ s0 + δ > s0. Furthermore, θ′ is strictly positive on
]s0, s
+[. But this is in contradiction with Lemma 44. Similarly, the assumption θ′(s0) < 0
is in contradiction with the dual result Lemma 45. And we must therefore have θ′(s0) = 0.
Suppose now that θ′′(s0) > 0. Then there exists ǫ > 0 such that θ′ > 0 on ]s0, s0 + ǫ[ in
contradiction with Lemma 44. With the same arguments, it is impossible that θ′′(s0) < 0
and the lemma is proved.
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Lemma 47. c1 = c2.
Proof. Indeed, equation D-1 gives, for i = 1, 2:
ci =
fν(ψ
′
i(s0))ψ
′′
i (s0)H
′(s0ψ′i(s0)− ψi(s0))
N (s0)
But, according to Lemma 46 the right hand side does not depend on i.
Proof of Theorem 30.
Let c denote the common value c := c1 = c2. Our two functions ψ1 and ψ2 are now
solutions to the same differential equation:
ψ′′(s) = F (s, ψ(s), ψ′(s))
where
F (s, x, y) :=
cN (s)
H ′(sy − x)fµ(y)
Due to our assumptions A1, A2 on fµ and H, F is C
1 with respect to (s, x, y). There-
fore, according to Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem, ψ1 and ψ2 must coincide since they are both
solution of the same differential equation and have the same initial conditions ψ(s0), ψ
′(s0)
at s = s0.
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